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Dissolving Cities
ABSTRACT. During the twentieth century, thousands of new cities took shape across
America. Stucco subdivisions sprawled and law followed, enabling suburbs to adopt
independent governments. That story is familiar. But meanwhile, something else was also
happening. A smaller but sizable number of cities were dying, closing down their municipal
governments and returning to dependence on counties. Some were ghost towns, emptied of
population. In those places, jobs were lost and families struggled; crops died off and industries
moved on. Other dead cities were humming with civic life: places with people but no longer with
separate governments. In these cities, citizens from the political left and right, often in coalition,
rose up to eliminate their local governments.
As an end in itself, understanding these changes would be worthwhile. But this past has
not passed. Unprecedented numbers of cities and citizens are currently considering
disincorporation in response to economic crisis and population loss. The dissolution law to
which they are turning, as it is written in state codes and as it is understood in theory, is immature
and thin. Cities' experiences with dissolution are unknown, constraining our ability to judge the
values it serves or undermines. If dissolution is to grow in importance as part of the legal
machinery of urban decline, we must understand what it meant in the decades that came before.
Dissolving Cities tells the story of municipal dissolution. It is an article of law, theory, and
urban history -a reminder that urban growth and local government fragmentation, which have
long dominated academic discourse on cities, may not be the upward ratchet we have assumed
them to be. Cities can die, and when they do, they raise critical questions about decline,
governance, taxes, race, and community.
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INTRODUCTION
Our rural and urban past echoes with memories of cities that came and
went. People left, tax revenue sank, and city halls closed their doors. The siren
of industry and the winds of the Dust Bowl left only ghosts behind in
hundreds of towns in the South and Midwest. When the segregated poverty in
central cities fueled riots in the 1960s and 199os, smaller cities across the
country drank a quieter, more final poison. And today, sidewalks in the
Northeast that once carried the morning rush of workers to industrial plants
and mills have gone empty. Clanging steel has left behind the silence of rust.
If the incorporation of a legal city expresses an upward arc of development
and growth, the legal disincorporation of a city marks decline. The shutting
down of municipal government signals that a community can no longer sustain
the cost and institutional responsibility of cityhood. Population, finances, or
faith in civic institutions has simply lost too much ground. Perhaps that is why
legal scholars have cared so little about municipal dissolution, a subject that has
occupied fewer scholarly pages than the number of years in a century- and
most of those pages were written a century ago.' Yet dissolutions happen, and
if ever there has been a wave of them, we are in one now. More than half of the
dissolutions ever recorded took place in the past fifteen years. At least 130 cities
have dissolved since 2000 -nearly as many as incorporated during that same
period.' Beyond these dissolutions that happen, both past and pending, are
1. The sum total of scholarship, legal or otherwise, to have addressed municipal dissolution in
more than a token few words consists of the following: Michael W. McConnell & Randal C.
Picker, When Cities Go Broke: A Conceptual Introduction to Municipal Bankruptcy, 6o U. CHI.
L. REV. 425 (1993) (providing the most substantial contribution to this topic in decades,
though dissolution is considered only as a method for reforming municipal bankruptcy
law); Richard W. Flournoy, Jr., The Rights of Creditors of a Municipal Corporation When the
State Has Passed a Law To Abolish or Alter It, 12 VA. L. REG. 175 (1906) (focusing on
municipal debt following dissolution); Comment, Legislative Power over the Contracts of a
Municipal Corporation, 15 YALE L.J. 363 (1906) (same). The failed dissolution effort in Miami
received careful attention as a case study in thwarted regionalism. See Annette Steinacker,
Prospects for Regional Governance: Lessons from the Miami Abolition Vote, 37 URB. AFF. REV.
1oo (2001). One article in the popular press drew attention to municipal dissolution as a
national phenomenon (in addition to the hundreds of newspaper articles on events in
specific cities that provided a research base for this Article). See Bobby White, Towns Rethink
Self-Reliance as Finances Worsen, WALL ST. J., May 27, 2009, http://online.wsj.com/article/
SB124337975286456249.htmi. One valuable article focuses on the related but importantly
distinct question of the dissolution of special districts. See Nicholas G. Bauroth, The Strange
Case of the Disappearing Special Districts: Toward a Theory of Dissolution, 40 AM. REV. PUB.
ADMIN. 568 (2010).
2. For a list of dissolved cities, see Appendix B. By comparison, 154 new municipalities formed




scores of others that do not- cities that might have dissolved yesterday, or that
perhaps should dissolve tomorrow.
This Article opens the graves of our departed cities and visits the deathbed
towns following closely behind. It provides the first academic theorization of
dissolution, locating dissolution in the literature on local government law,
urban planning, and urban history. It introduces the law of dissolution across
the country and the real-life phenomenon on the ground, generating a draft list
of the occupants in our country's municipal cemetery. Reading across this
landscape of places and memories, the Article evaluates the issues at stake in
dissolution and theorizes dissolution's potential as a public policy option. It
thus claims, for the first time, a place for dissolution in the cycle of institutional
life and change in American local government law.
To get started, a definition: municipal dissolution, also known as
disincorporation, is the termination of the political unit of an incorporated
municipality, whether city, village, or incorporated town.' A municipality can
dissolve in order to disincorporate permanently or to reorganize incorporated
territory, such as by merging two cities into one. Dissolution into a county and
dissolution into another city (merger) can have important similarities, such as
origins in economic decline and the loss of a city population's separate legal
identity and political autonomy. A project entitled "Dissolving Cities" could
have been about all of these changes. This Article is not; instead, it focuses on
the subset of dissolutions that indefinitely remove a layer of municipal
government and return a population to unincorporated county or township
jurisdiction.' This kind of dissolution is significantly distinct from mergers or
http://www.census.gov/geo/www/bndrychanges/boundary changes.html (data analysis on
file with author).
3. Throughout this Article, I use the word "cities" to mean municipal corporations, including
incorporated villages, towns, and boroughs. The word is not used to suggest any particular
degree of scale or urbanization.
4. In most states, predominantly in the West and the South, nonmunicipal land is
"unincorporated"- that is, it relies on the counties for a single layer of direct, general-
purpose local government, including the exercise of police powers and policymaking. In a
smaller set of states, primarily Midwestern ones, a township governs all nonmunicipal land
and serves as its general-purpose local government, thus giving these residents two tiers of
general-purpose local government (township and county). See i U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 2002
CENSUS OF GOvERNMENTS, No. 1, GOVERNMENT ORGANIZATION, GCo2(1)-1, at vi (2002)
[hereinafter 2002 CENSUS OF GOVERNMENTS], available at http://www.census.gov/prod/
2003pubs/gco2ix.pdf. In some states, including New York, midlevel townships are called
"towns," though they should not be confused with incorporated places referred to as
"towns" in other states. Townships may have an extremely limited range of functions (e.g.,
management only of roads, as in Ohio) or a broader set of functions (e.g., a full array of
services, including human and social services, as in Illinois). These townships are
1367
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
other reorganizations, because it requires vertical restructuring and a shift in
authority to counties and their subdivisions.
Throughout this Article, dissolution therefore refers only to the
termination of an incorporated municipality where its territory reverts to
dependence on county or township government. In the early twentieth century,
these dissolutions were often by operation of law for local government
inactivity -merely a state acknowledgment that a town had gone bust. But in
the post-World War II era, dissolution is more often a voluntary, active choice
by a living community: residents or city councils choose to eliminate their city
government. Instead of municipal government and county government (or a
county and a county subdivisions), the area reverts to unincorporated county
rule alone.6 Politicians and public employees lose their jobs; an entity's
revenues, assets, contracts, and debts must be reorganized; public services
must be pared down or passed off; and a body of local laws, including land-use
plans, is nullified. A city's territory may retain population-it may even retain
markers of placehood and identity like a name used orally or recognized by the
Post Office-but its separate local government is gone. The city's records are
taken to county storage; its people may or may not preserve a community
history.
To interrogate and rethink the law of dissolution, the central mission of
this Article and its larger arc of research, we need some understanding of our
history of dissolving cities: Which cities have dissolved, in which states? When
have cities dissolved, and do these dates suggest a relationship between
dissolution and state or national events, such as recessions or internal
migrations? Why do cities dissolve? In a society that keeps records on the
deaths of real persons and corporate entities, one might expect that it would be
conceptually distinct from "towns" or "townships" in New England, New Jersey, New York,
and Pennsylvania, which function for all intents and purposes as municipal corporations,
though their borders are rooted in historic state surveys rather than concentrations of
population or voluntary creation by residents.
s. Because neither counties nor county subdivisions (like townships) have control over their
territory (as discussed in Section I.B, infra), they are importantly similar for purposes of the
present account. Hereinafter, the term "counties" will stand in for "counties and county
subdivisions" where appropriate. This is an imperfect word choice, but it is necessitated by
American states' varied systems and nomenclatures for local governments. My future work
on county governments will explore the commonalities, differences, and relationships
among these layers of government. The best general resource for differentiating this terrain
is the 2002 Census of Governments. See 2002 CENSUS OF GOVERNMENTS, supra note 4.
6. For further descriptive ease in this Article, and to emphasize the municipal incorporation-
versus-nonincorporation distinction, the term "unincorporated" is used to refer to any land
that reverts to township or county status, even though some states do not use that term of




easy to find a single, comprehensive federal list or dozens of separate state lists
of dearly departed cities. That is not the case.' While historians and
sociologists have widely researched urbanization, population migration, rural
crisis, urban abandonment, and related topics, they seem to have overlooked
(or at least failed to record) the location and timing of territories'
transformation from legal municipality to just a place. Even the cottage
industry of historical, hobbyist, and travel literature on ghost towns does not
help in any systematic way: such lists rely on indicators of human settlement
and abandonment like the opening and closing of a federal post office rather
than the rise and fall of administrative independence.' And ghost town records
cannot tell us anything about the higher number of cities in the modern era
that dissolved without physical abandonment. While dissolution of a legal city
may be a relative of depopulation in general, it warrants separate study as a
distinctive phenomenon, because it represents a set of governance choices and
implications that play out at the communal and institutional level.'
The legal, historical, and academic records of actual municipal dissolutions
are thus incomplete along the dimensions of both geography and time. By
unearthing and consolidating a single layer of hundreds of information
fragments from across the country and across time, this Article generates a first
draft Graveyard of American Cities, which includes a municipal name, state,
and year of dissolution. To provide a foundation for social science research that
asks not only why dissolutions occur, but why they do not occur, the Article
also assembles a list of cities where dissolution was legally proposed but
rejected, as well as a list of cities currently in the throes of dissolution proceedings.
Part I defines and frames dissolution. Two examples, one from the Village
of Seneca Falls in Western New York and the other from Miami, Florida,
7. The U.S. Census Bureau has records of dissolutions dating back to the early twentieth
century, but its records of changes are patchy, dramatically incomplete, and only partially
consolidated in electronic form. See infra Part II and Appendix A (Methodology).
8. See, e.g., JOHN W. MoRRIs, GHOST TOWNS OF OKLAHOMA (1977) (using the opening and
closing of post offices as the basis of records); Mary Emma Milner Montgomery, Little
Known or "Extinct Towns," Ca. 1940, KAN. HISTORuCAL Soc'Y, http://www.kshs.org/p/little
-known-or-extinct-towns-ca-1940/11305 (last visited Sept. 5, 2011) (same). The literature on
ghost towns, mining camps, and the like is too extensive to recite in full here-it would
seem that there is at least one book per state, often several. I conducted targeted research
within this literature in order to locate records of legal dissolutions as well as to confirm or
explain previously identified dissolutions. As appropriate, these sources are cited herein.
9. See Emily Mackil, Wandering Cities: Alternatives to Catastrophe in the Greek Polis, 1o8 AM. J.
ARCHAEOLOGY 493, 494 (2004) (analyzing the abandonment of Greek city-states during the
Classical and Hellenistic periods, and arguing that abandonment of Greek polis should be
treated separately from abandonments on other scales and in other contexts).
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provide an orientation to the phenomenon in two notable places. In Miami,
Florida, the crush of multimillion-dollar debts and deficits, explosive
foreclosure rates, and spiraling unemployment led the city to hold an election
(ultimately unsuccessful) on dissolution into Dade County. Dissolution also
shows up in communities like Seneca Falls, where a present quaintness belies
its place in the history of America's great industrial upstarts. These smaller
cities remind us that industrialism, and its freefall, were not limited to big cities
like Detroit and Buffalo. To establish our legal bearings, this Part also
introduces and classifies states' dissolution laws, and it distinguishes
dissolution from municipal bankruptcy, a distinct response to fiscal distress.
Part II, along with Appendices A-E, gives a broader picture of dissolution
across geography and time by presenting my national investigation of past and
current dissolution activity. Dissolution activity (including approved, rejected,
pending, and inchoate dissolutions) shows up in thirty-nine states, and more
cities approved or considered dissolution between 2000 and 2010 than did in
the thirty years prior, between 1970 and 20oo. Among these states, New York
is of particular interest, and Part II offers a picture of its dissolution activity.
There, dissolution has become a public-policy objective aimed at curbing local
government fragmentation and reducing taxes, especially in economically
depressed regions.
Based on these lists, as well as an assembled archive of several hundred
media and historical sources regarding dissolving cities, Part III synthesizes
core issues at stake in dissolution law. It uses the histories of particular cities to
consider why people propose, and ultimately approve or reject, dissolution in
struggling cities. Rather than an empirical question of political causation, the
"why" explored here is broader, more theoretical, and more historical. Part III
investigates the problems that triggered drives for dissolution and the public
claims that proponents made about disincorporation as a solution. From these
observations, I offer five themes of municipal dissolution: decline, taxes,
reform, race, and community. These categories sketch dissolution's shape and
potential, while building a foundation for later empirical research. Along the
way, Part III introduces an impassioned, if motley, band of dissolution
crusaders, from "elderly ladies in tennis shoes""o fighting local mismanagement
to politicians bent on slashing local taxes.
Parts I to III thus begin to write the story of dissolution in law and history.
Part IV stands on this foundation to establish dissolution's place in local
government and urban theory and to map dissolution's normative
implications. I provide an account of local institutional design and boundary




change that acknowledges not just how cities grow but how they decline, not
just how places choose governance by cities, but how they choose governance
by counties. The Article expands the conversation about coping with America's
"shrinking cities," a discourse heretofore located in land-use planning, into the
realm of governance changes. I offer the language and concept of "shrinking
governance" to capture dissolution and other ways that people are currently
seeking to ameliorate economic decline, minimize fragmentation among local
governments, and decrease state and local taxes by reducing the number,
powers, and costs of local governments.
For these many struggling localities and their states, Part IV provides
normative guideposts in our longer-term discussion of dissolution as a matter
of public policy, lays parameters for state-level legal reform, and defines key
considerations for decisionmakers on dissolution. Among other conclusions, I
argue that incorporation law and dissolution law should be planned and
developed as an integrated body of law, with careful decisions about the
symmetries or asymmetries between city formation and the reversion to
unincorporated status. To help encourage and support our understanding of
dissolution and its potential, Part IV also maps directions for future research.
As closure, Part V offers a reflection about what it means for cities to die as a
formal, legal matter, even when a community of people continues to live there;
indeed, even when a community of people is so alive as to mobilize in pursuit
of democratic restructuring as dramatic as the death of government itself.
In the end, I will not offer a prognosis of dissolution as good or bad, just or
unjust. Such a judgment would be oversimplified and premature. Indeed, after
decades of exhaustive research on the proliferation of new legal cities, few
scholars, if any, would offer a blanket assessment of whether incorporation is
desirable as a general matter. Instead, careful research on the phenomenon has
yielded an understanding of the circumstances in which incorporation favors or
disfavors particular values. This Article exposes a range of circumstances,
purposes, and implications of dissolution, thus providing a window into its
promise and perils, and a road map for a new law of dissolution to favor the
former and minimize the latter.
An exercise of history, an exercise of explanation, Dissolving Cities explores
one of the most intriguing options facing many of our struggling towns and
cities. When the arc of urban growth flatlines, should communities leave
cityhood behind?
1. WHAT IS DISSOLUTION?
The Wall Street Journal reported in 2009 that "[a]s the recession batters city
budgets around the U.S., some municipalities are considering the once-
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unthinkable option of dissolving themselves through 'disincorporation.""' The
Journal's article reported only the tip of this particular iceberg, though it was
on to something. What is dissolution? This Part offers a picture of dissolution
in fact and frames dissolution in law, on its own terms and as compared to
municipal bankruptcy.
A. Two Stories: Seneca Falls and Miami
Two cities help to frame and understand dissolution. The fabled and
floundering Village of Seneca Falls in New York State provides an
unrepresentative but richly textured vehicle for exploring dissolution as an
answer to industrial decline. Seneca Falls incorporated in 1837." Today it is a
sleepy community of 6635 residents." The stately brick main street is just a few
shops long, most of which cater to historical tourists. The Seneca River that
runs through the downtown is bordered by a scenic walking path. Visitors
today might marvel that Seneca Falls figured so prominently in American social
and political history. It was a center of the abolitionist movement and the
temperance movement and the home of the first Convention on Women's
Rights in 1848, organized by Jane Hunt, Elizabeth Cady Stanton, and others.
How could monumental social movements have anchored themselves in such a
minor place?' 4 In part, the answer must be that the Seneca Falls of today bears
little resemblance to its nineteenth- and early twentieth-century youth. In the
flush of industrialization, Seneca Falls was a chaotic, growing river port. The
banks of the Seneca River, which was connected to the Erie Canal in 1828, once
defined a booming industrial corridor of mills, tanneries, distilleries, and
factories. A railroad line in 1841 "opened the door to the world market for
goods manufactured in Seneca Falls.""
11. White, supra note 1.
12. DISSOLUTION STUDY COMM. & CTR. FOR Gov'T RESEARCH, INC., VILLAGE OF SENECA FALLS
DISSOLUTION PLAN: FINAL REPORT ON DISSOLUTION AND ALTERNATIVES To DISSOLUTION
FOR THE VILLAGE OF SENECA FALLS 1 (Nov. 2009) [hereinafter DISSOLUTION STUDY COMM.] ,
available at http://www.cgr.org/senecafalls/documents.aspx.
13. 2oo9 Population Estimates, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, http://factfinder.census.gov/servlet/
SAFFPopulation?-submenuld=population o& sse=on (select "New York" from drop-down
menu; search for "Seneca Falls Village") (last visited Nov. 29, 2011).
14. For histories of the women's movement and its origins in Seneca Falls, see, for example,
ELISABETH GRIFFITH, IN HER OwN RIGHT: THE LIFE OF ELIZABETH CADY STANTON (1984);
and MIRIAM GURKO, THE LADIES OF SENECA FALLS: THE BIRTH OF THE WOMEN'S RIGHTS
MOVEMENT (1974).
is. Historic Summary of Seneca Falls, NY, SENECA FALLS, N.Y., http://www.senecafalls.com/




What today is a quaint community was once a thriving industrial upstart -
the kind of place that reminds us that American industrialization was not
limited to the likes of Buffalo, Pittsburgh, and Chicago. In the mid-nineteenth
century, Seneca Falls began to decline, eclipsed by the new major
manufacturing centers of the region, Syracuse and Rochester." Much of its
waterfront industry was torn down to make room for an enlarged canal and its
population fell. In 2010, the Village of Seneca Falls voted 1198 to 1112 to
dissolve." A dissolution plan informed voters and officials about the effect of
the change claimed a wide range of benefits from dissolution, such as reduced
costs for Village residents, "eliminat[ion of] an invisible boundary that divides
the community" between the Town8 and Village, and increased participation
by Village residents in Town affairs." Approval of dissolution by the Village
responded not just to deindustrialization and population loss, but to
preferences about local governance.
Seneca Falls is a small community, like many cities with dissolution
activity. Far from Seneca Falls, in climate as in scale, the City of Miami offers a
contrasting vehicle for introducing key themes and dynamics in dissolution.
While Miami is less typical of cities captured in this Article's Appendices in
terms of population, it is not alone among big-city members, and it frames
important causal and normative dimensions of dissolution.
The City of Miami held an election to consider dissolution into Dade
County in 1996. Miami's city government was awash in crisis: a corruption
scandal, a crushing deficit and plummeting bond rating, a state declaration of
fiscal emergency, and property tax rates nearly double the rates of neighboring
incorporated suburbs and more than four times those of the unincorporated
areas of Dade County."o A grassroots organization called the Citizens for Lower
Taxes launched a successful petition drive to qualify a dissolution referendum
for the ballot." The group's public rhetoric framed its objectives in terms of
gains for everyone in Miami: Reduce taxes! Fight corruption! Improve
services! Dade County, it reasoned, could better serve the people of Miami.
16. SPURGEON KING, NAT'L PARK SERV., OMB No. io24-oo18, NATIONAL REGISTER OF HISTORIC
PLACES: REGISTRATION FORM FOR SENECA FALLS VILLAGE HISTORIC DISTRICT (1990).
17. Investigating Options for the Future, SENECA FALLS, http://www.cgr.org/senecafalls (last
visited Feb. 7, 2011).
i8. New York counties are subdivided into towns. See supra note 5 (explaining the equivalence
of counties and their subdivisions for present purposes); infra Section II.C (describing the
particulars of local government in New York).
19. DISSOLUTION STUDY COMM., supra note 12, at 4.
20. Steinacker, supra note 1, at 108-09.
21. Id. at 109.
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The proposal in Miami looked like a preference for county government,
and to some extent, it was. But the dissolution campaign was also a breakaway
attempt by wealthier neighborhoods within Miami that wanted their own legal
cities. Miami's Citizens for Lower Taxes was led by an attorney who had
successfully championed the incorporation of several wealthy unincorporated
enclaves and a "neighborhood incorporation movement" in Dade County. He
and his supporters saw dissolution as a stepping-stone to city formation."
Postdissolution, once back in the undifferentiated county, wealthy enclaves
could form their own cities without obtaining approval from Miami's
electorate. For legal reasons explored in this Article, the two-step sequence of
successful dissolution followed by city formation (unlike a one-step secession
or deannexation) put the boundaries and terms of incorporation solely in the
wealthy enclaves' hands.' As it happened, the Miami electorate gave the same
answer to the two-step breakaway that it would undoubtedly have given to a
one-step approach: no. Recognition of the breakaway intentions of dissolution
leaders undermined the group's claims that dissolution would improve the tax
and service profile for all Miami.
Miami is the largest city identified in the present Article to have formally
considered dissolution. Yet, as discussed further in Section C below and in Part
III, other large cities have raised the possibility of dissolution as a solution to
economic woe, often as an alternative or supplement to bankruptcy. And as
discussed in Part II, the Miami experience provides particularly important
22. Id.
23. Id. at 104-05.
24. To further explain this point, the residents of Miami's wealthy neighborhoods had three
choices available to them when they decided that they wanted to form their own cities. First,
these areas could have sought secession, a single-step reorganization in which the wealthy
enclaves could withdraw from Miami to form new cities. Second, they could have sought
deannexation, a process that would return selected parts of Miami to unincorporated status
within Dade County. And third, they could (and did) choose a two-step scenario:
dissolution of Miami, followed by incorporation of select neighborhoods as new cities. All
three scenarios would require at least one round of consent by all voters within Miami. Yet
the first two options look foolhardy as a matter of political strategy, because they seem only
to have the enclaves' self-interest at heart. To see why, consider the secession movements in
the Borough of Staten Island in New York City and in the San Fernando Valley in the City
of Los Angeles. The larger city electorates defeated both secession efforts, primarily because
of tax revenue that New York City and Los Angeles were sure to lose. See Richard Briffault,
Voting Rights, Home Rule, and Metropolitan Governance: The Secession of Staten Island as a Case
Study in the Dilemmas of Local Self-Determination, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 775 (1992); Gerald E.
Frug, Is Secession from the City ofLos Angeles a Good Idea?, 49 UCLA L. REV. 1783 (2002).




insights about dissolution's potential implications for race, redistribution, and
reform.
B. Dissolution in Law
The purposes and mechanics of annexation and incorporation law have
occupied thousands of pages of literature in political science, urban planning,
and law. State code provisions reflect careful consideration of these two forms
of boundary change, offering rules and exceptions to govern circumstances
ranging from topography to fiscal impacts. Nearly every state has such laws,
and there are few characteristics (like size) that disqualify a city from forming
or growing. Dissolution law, by contrast, anticipates few takers and fewer
controversies. It often occupies no more than a few code sections in each state,
if any. Given the range of cities that have considered, if not completed,
dissolution, the basics become both more important and more contestable.
This Section offers an overview of the existing law of dissolution across the
country.
"Dissolution law" is unconstrained by federal law except insofar as it
infringes on fundamental rights or creates a suspect classification.26 The power
to dissolve a local government (like the power to create one or change its
borders) comes from a state constitution and state laws. This level of choice
has been usefully referred to as the "enabling level" -the state-level laws that
establish the structural options available to local governments and the rules by
which local actors may order and reorder their local governments." The
application of these rules to specific cities and the decision to dissolve a city
(with some exceptions) are local actions, referred to as the "chartering level." 9
This Section focuses on the enabling level, where state law determines who
may initiate dissolution and who may approve it, along with the conditions
26. See Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339, 344-45 (1960) (holding that "[1]egislative control
of municipalities, no less than other state power, lies within the scope of relevant limitations
imposed by the United States Constitution"); Hunter v. Pittsburgh, 207 U.S. 161, 178
(1907) (holding that the law of municipal boundary change lies within the discretion of the
state).
27. 1 SANDRA M. STEVENSON, ANTIEAU ON LocAL GOVERNMENT LAw, DISSOLUTION OF LOcAL
GOVERNMENT ENTITIES S 2.01-.05 (2d ed. 2010) (quoting City of Milwaukee v. Sewerage
Comm'n, 67 N.W.2d 264 (Wis. 1954), and other cases).
28. Bauroth, supra note 1, at 571; Ronald J. Oakerson & Roger B. Parks, Local Government
Constitutions: A Diferent View ofMetropolitan Governance, 19 AM. REV. PUB. ADMIN. 279, 282
(1989).
29. Oakerson & Parks, supra note 28, at 279.
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under which dissolution may or may not occur. Forty states have dissolution
codes of some kind-a number representing all but two states where
dissolution would be theoretically possible under the structure of local
government in the state.30 Structurally, dissolution is not possible in states that
have no unincorporated territory to which a city can revert, including
Pennsylvania, New Jersey, Hawaii, and the states of New England (excluding
Maine and New Hampshire)."' In those states, reorganizing a local government
tier (e.g., through merger) may be possible, but eliminating one is not.
Within the enabling level, dissolutions and dissolution law should be
classified into three categories: passive, involuntary, and voluntary. The first
two lie solely in the power of the state; the third requires formal local initiation
or consent. Passive dissolutions occur by operation of law for inactivity (a
classic ghost town scenario), usually defined as the failure to elect or appoint
municipal officers, levy and collect taxes, provide services, or undertake other
basic activities.32 Some passive dissolution laws also provide for automatic
dissolution when a municipality's population falls below a stated threshold, a
legal feature that I will take up at greater length in Section III.A. Fifteen states
have passive dissolution laws."
30. The exceptions are North Carolina and Delaware. See Michelle Wilde Anderson, State
Municipal Dissolution Law (table on file with author analyzing dissolution laws, or noting
the absence thereof, in every state). Local government structure in each state, and thus the
theoretical possibility of dissolution, was assessed using the following source: I U.S. CENSUS
BUREAU, 2002 CENSUS OF GOVERNMENTS, No. 2, INDIVIDUAL STATE DESCRIPTIONS, GCo2(1)-2
(2002), available at http://www.census.gov/prod/2o05pubs/gco21x2.pdf
31. There are three reasons a state can lack unincorporated land: the state (i) lacks general-
purpose, elected county governments or county subdivisions for most or all of its territory
(as in the states of New England), (2) has already vertically consolidated its cities and
counties (as in Hawaii), or (3) does have functioning county governments, but has an
incorporated, lower-tier, general-purpose government (city, town, etc.) over all territory
within the state (as in New Jersey and Pennsylvania). Maine and New Hampshire have land
that falls directly under state control (referred to as "disorganized territory" in Maine or
"unincorporated territory" in New Hampshire). See id.
32. Some states have laws that deem inactive municipalities to be dissolved as a matter of law,
with inactivity defined in terms such as the failure to provide services, to hold elections,
and/or to levy and collect taxes. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 11-41-24 (LexisNexis 2008); GA. CODE
ANN. 5 36-30-7.1 (20o6); IOWA CODE ANN. § 368.3 (West Supp. 2011). In the absence of
such a law, a dormant municipality will continue to exist legally until state or local actors
complete dissolution procedures. See, e.g., Treadwell v. Town of Oak Hill, 175 So. 2d 777,
777-78 (Fla. 1965); Riddle v. Howard, 357 S.W.2d 705, 708 (Ky. 1962).
33. States with passive dissolution laws include: Alabama, Arkansas, Georgia, Indiana, Iowa,
Kentucky, Louisiana, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Oklahoma, South Carolina,
Tennessee, Utah, and West Virginia. See ALA. CODE § 11-41-24; ARK. CODE ANN. § 14-39-




Involuntary dissolutions are also state-initiated, but they are applied to
populated municipalities and may override a local preference against
dissolution. Such dissolutions are not codified in state law at all. Instead, they
can be thought of in terms of reserved powers of the state to terminate its
subdivisions -powers that will vary according to state constitutional and
statutory law, particularly the delegation of home-rule authority. Involuntary
dissolutions are quite rare and confrontational, and research for this Article
indicates that they arise only in cases of corruption or chronic mismanagement.
In such cases, legislators enact a dissolution through a state special act to
dissolve a city or class of cities, an action that may be initiated by a civil grand
jury, district attorney, or other local actor. Such dissolutions present
challenging legal conflicts between state power and constitutional home-rule
authority.3 4 The few involuntary dissolutions identified in the present Article
involved a state/local clash, including opposing partisan affiliations at the state
and the city levels.
Voluntary dissolutions originate from the city itself-either its residents or
its leaders. Dissolution is overwhelmingly conceived of in this way, i.e., as a
locally initiated, locally approved process. Thirty-seven states have voluntary
dissolution laws on their books.3s Indeed, only three states that have
dissolution codes do not permit locally initiated proceedings. At the level of
individual resident empowerment to effectuate dissolution, most state laws
permit residents to trigger the start of dissolution proceedings (such as an
election on the question, or a study on the impacts of dissolution)." Once
initiated, who approves dissolution? In a few states, a dissolution petition itself
§ 368.3; Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. 5 81.094 (LexisNexis 2011); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. 5 33:231
(2011); MIss. CODE ANN. §§ 21-1-49, 21-1-51 (2011); Mo. REV. STAT. § 79.490 (2010);
MONT. CODE ANN. 5 7-2-4901 (2010); OKLA. STAT. tit. 11, §5 7-105 to 7-107 (2009); S.C.
CODE ANN. 5-1 -100 (2009); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 6-52-301 to 6-52-302 (2010); UTAH
CODE ANN. 5 10-2-710 (LexisNexis 2010); W. VA. CODE § 8-35-1 (2010).
34. In the face of a state legislative proposal to dissolve the City of Vernon, California, attorneys
for the City threatened a lawsuit challenging the City's proposed involuntary dissolution by
the State under the City's charter powers. Sam Allen, Vernon Mounts Campaign To Squelch
Legislation That Would Remove Its Cityhood, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 30, 2010,
http://articles.latimes.com/2o10/dec/3o/local/la-me-vernon-20101230.
3s. This list includes all states except the following: Connecticut, Delaware, Hawaii,
Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New Jersey, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island,
and Vermont. See Anderson, supra note 30.
36. These include Arkansas, Georgia, and South Carolina, which provide for passive
dissolutions but not voluntary ones. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 14-39-102; GA. CODE ANN. § 36-
30-7.1; S.C. CODE ANN. 5 5-1-loo. Georgia expressly reserves power to the state to enact a
dissolution. GA. CODE ANN. 5 36-35-2.
37. See generally STEVENSON, supra note 27, 5 2.03 (summarizing dissolution law).
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is the mechanism of approval. If a state permits dissolution of a city via petition
without a confirming election or legislative decision, it usually requires higher
signature thresholds - such as petition signatures by three-fourths (Alabama) 8
or two-thirds (Arizona, Missouri)39 of qualified electors. More commonly,
voters must approve dissolution via a general or special election, regardless of
whether it has been initiated by a petition or a vote of the governing body.40 In
a handful of states, dissolution must be approved by a state board or local-
regional boundary commission before heading to an election, and records from
California suggest that several dissolutions in that state have been derailed at
this stage.4 ' Alternately, dissolution may remain the province only of the state
legislature, a rule likely based on the assumption that dissolutions are too rare
to require delegation to local governments.42 Courts may also have a limited
38. ALA. CODE 5 11-31-21 (LexisNexis 20o6).
39. Aiuz. REV. STAT.ANN. § 9-102 (2008); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 79.495 (West 1998).
40. ALASKA STAT.'§§ 29.o6.470, 29.o6.51o (2010) (requiring approval of the majority of
registered voters via special election); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 165 .051(l)(b) (West 2000)
(requiring approval of qualified voters via either general or special election); IDAHO CODE
ANN. §§ 50-2201, 50-2204 (2009) (requiring supermajority approval via special election);
65 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/7-6-1, 5/7-6-3 (2005) (requiring majority approval by electors in
the municipality); IND. CODE ANN. 5 36-5-1-18 (LexisNexis 2000) (requiring a
supermajority of votes cast and four-fifths of voters counted in a municipal census); KY.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 81.094(2) (LexisNexis 2009) (requiring majority approval at a general
election); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 33:253 (2002) (requiring majority approval at a special
election in which only property owners can vote); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 30-A, 5 7209
(2009) (requiring approval by a supermajority of voters voting in a general election);
MONT. CODE ANN. § 7-2-4905 (2009) (requiring sixty percent approval in a general
election); NEB. REV. STAT. § 13-2812 (2007) (requiring majority approval in a general or
special election); N.Y. GEN. MUN. LAw §§ 780-781 (McKinney 2009) (requiring majority
approval in a special election); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 40-53.1-03,40-53.1-04 (2010) (requiring
majority approval in a special election); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 6-52-201, 6-52-205 (2010)
(requiring majority approval in a special election); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 10-2-701, 10-2-705
(LexisNexis 2007) (requiring majority approval in a special election); WASH. REV. CODE
ANN. §§ 35.07.040, 35.07.080 (West 2010) (requiring majority approval in a special
election); W. VA. CODE § 8-35-2 (LexisNexis 2007) (requiring majority approval of qualified
voters via either general or special election); Wisc. STAT. ANN. § 60.03(2), (5)(b) (West
2010) (requiring majority approval of electors at the annual town meeting).
41. See, e.g., IOWA CODE ANN. § 368.11 (West 1999) (permitting a city council, board of
supervisors, or five percent of the affected city electorate to submit a petition for
discontinuance to the state's City Development Board, which rules on the petition); see also
Peter M. Detwiler, Daniel A. Obermeyer & George Spiliotis, Disincorporations in California
(informal report provided via correspondence on July 26, 2010 with Bill Chiat, Exec. Dir. of
Cal. Ass'n of Local Agency Formation Comm'ns) (on file with author).
42. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 165.o51() (a); GA. CODE ANN. § 36-35-2 (2011); LA. REv. STAT. ANN.




role to play. Though dissolution is a legislative function that cannot be
delegated entirely to the courts, state legislatures may delegate authority to
courts to determine satisfaction of statutory dissolution procedures and
requirements.43
Dissolution has important consequences for the county or county
subdivision into which a city is dissolving. It expands the unincorporated
territory of the county, thus affecting counties' budgets (both revenue and
costs); bringing new territory and residents into the administrative and land-
use planning responsibility of county staff; potentially expanding the territory
of county service providers like law enforcement and street maintenance;
bringing new properties, assets, and records under county management; and
more. If the dissolving city is considerably more populous than the county's
other unincorporated territory, the significance is even greater, as captured in
Part III.
Yet reading the law governing how to dissolve a city, one might not guess
that these impacts on counties were of any significance. Very few states give
counties a right to notice regarding a pending dissolution; even fewer states
give counties any rights to influence the outcome of a proposed dissolution.
Michigan, Florida, and California have the strongest laws to protect counties.
Michigan's dissolution laws protect the receiving county subdivision (in that
case, townships) with approval rights over the dissolution as well as half the
seats on a disincorporation commission established prior to a dissolution
election.44 Florida and California protect counties and the dissolving city's
residents by imposing substantive limitations on dissolution. In Florida,
dissolutions (1) may not create islands of unincorporated land surrounded by
other municipalities, (2) must account for a county's ability to provide services
to the dissolving city's territory, and (3) require an "equitable arrangement" for
any bonded indebtedness or any vested rights of public employees.4s
43. ALA. CODE § 11-41-23 (LexisNexis 2010) (empowering courts to decree a dissolution
following a valid petition and public hearing); ALASKA STAT. 5 29.o6.500 (2010) (permitting
appeal of the decision of the Local Boundary Commission concerning the acceptance of a
dissolution petition); ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9-102 (2010) (providing for postapproval
court proceedings); IND. CODE ANN. 5 36-5-1-19 (LexisNexis 2010) (permitting appeal to
the circuit court by the town legislative body); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 81.o96(2) (LexisNexis
2010) (contemplating nondiscretionary court review); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. 5 33:263 (2011)
(providing for judicial review of approved dissolutions); 56 AM. JUR. 2D Municipal
Corporations, Counties, and Other Political Subdivisions 5 82 (2011) (collecting authorities that
recognize a court's ability to review whether the requirements of a dissolution are met);
STEVENSON, supra note 27, § 2.02.
44. MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. §§ 74.18a, 74.23a (West 2010).
45. FLA. STAT. ANN. 5 165.061 (3) (West 2010).
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California's law defines substantive factors to consider during approval
proceedings by the regional boundary-change agency; these factors relate to
the need for and availability of postdissolution services, effects on the county's
"local governmental structure," and comments by the public and local agencies,
along with a miscellany of factors relating to water, transit, housing, and
environmental justice.46
In many states, population is a significant determinant of eligibility for
dissolution. Several states permit only municipalities under a certain
population threshold to dissolve voluntarily, and these caps tend to be quite
low (for instance, looo residents), or they permit only smaller municipalities
to dissolve.48 In other states, a population that falls beneath a statutory
threshold triggers involuntary dissolution (in this context, dissolution by
operation of law). These population limits are again surprisingly low, ranging
from So to 1100. 49 In either case, the thresholds are so low that these states
have effectively limited dissolution to ghost towns or rural enclaves. Perhaps
states impose these population limits on dissolution as a proxy for burdens on
county government; i.e., states limit dissolution of larger cities as a form of
protection for counties. If so, states have made the curious and rather blunt
assessment that it is population (rather than financial conditions, service needs,
county administrative capacity, spatial characteristics, or other factors) that
best predicts the impact of a city's dissolution on county government.
Furthermore, such limits convey that dissolution would never be in the public
interest for cities above a certain size.
Other than the substantive limits imposed in California and Florida, and
the population rules imposed in other states, dissolution law is utterly silent on
the characteristics of cities appropriate for dissolution, whether in terms of
finances, service needs, or available service providers. No state has a statutory
mandate of dissolution in the face of financial peril. No state appears to have
conditioned a city charter on fiscal solvency, forewarning the entity that
insolvency will destroy its corporate existence. Subject to the specifics of a
46. CAL. Gov'T. CODE § 56668 (West 2011).
47. See ALA. CODE § 11-41-20 (LexisNexis 20o8) (11oo residents or fewer); MISS. CODE ANN.
§21-1-53 (2011) (fewer than 1000 residents); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS 5 9-6-1 (2009) (fewer
than 250 residents).
48. See ARK. CODE ANN. S 14-39-101 (1998) (second-class cities and incorporated towns); Mo.
ANN. STAT. 5 79.490 (West 2011) (only fourth-class cities); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 8-35-2
(2007) (Class III cities and Class IV towns and villages).
49. See ALA. CODE § 11-41-24 (fewer than ioo); MIss. CODE ANN. § 21-1-49 (2007) (fewer than
so); S.C. CODE ANN. § 5-1-lo (2004) (fewer than 50); TENN. CODE ANN. § 6-52-301 (2005)




state's law, particularly its home-rule provisions, there is no reason such rules
would be impermissible; indeed, they would be analogous to those that
condition municipal existence upon a functioning local government.so
Even without formal input or veto authority for counties, mandatory
dissolution-planning requirements can be considered a means of improving
notice and transparency for counties, as well as a means of smoothing and
planning for an administrative transition from city to county status. Only a few
states have such requirements, however." New York has the most specific
provisions of this kind; they require a governing body to propose and publish a
plan for dissolution that covers topics such as: a fiscal estimate of the cost of
dissolution, any plan for transferring or eliminating public employees, the
city's assets and their fair value, the city's liabilities and debt and a plan for
disposing of them, an analysis of services and current service contracts, and a
plan for the legal transition into town jurisdiction.s2 This plan must be
submitted to public hearings.s"
Having said that counties enjoy few substantive or procedural advantages,
receiving counties and townships do have one very powerful protection during
dissolution: a dissolving city cannot pass its debt onto the entire county or
unincorporated area. Since the late nineteenth century, the Supreme Court has
interpreted the Contracts Clause of the U.S. Constitution to protect the rights
of a dissolved municipal corporation's creditors 4 (defined not to include
taxpayers 5 ). A state may not dissolve a municipality if the entity's creditors
would be left without "some effective means to collect the debts owed to
them.", 6 To address this rule, any state with voluntary dissolution laws must
5o. See supra text accompanying notes 32-33 (describing passive dissolutions by operation of law
for inactivity and population loss).
51. See MIcH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 74.23e (West 2010); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 13-2812(4),
17-219.03 (3)-(4) (West 2010); N.Y. GEN. MUN. LAw § 774 (McKinney 2010).
52. N.Y. GEN. MUN. LAw § 774.
53. See id. §5 775-776.
54. U.S. CONST. art I, § lo, cl. 1 ("No State shall ... pass any . .. Law impairing the Obligation
of Contracts. . . ."); Mobile v. Watson, 116 U.S. 289 (1886); Town of Mt. Pleasant v.
Beckwith, 100 U.S. 514 (1879); Green v. City of Asheville, 154 S.E. 852 (N.C. 1930); accord
Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339, 344 (i96o) ("[T]his Court [has] refused to allow a
State to abolish a municipality . . . without preserving to the creditors of the old city some
effective recourse for the collection of debts owed them."); Broughton v. Pensacola, 93 U.S.
266 (1876).
ss. Hunter v. City of Pittsburgh, 207 U.S. 161, 177 (1907) (defining the parties in contract with
a municipality not to include municipal taxpayers).
s6. City of Charleston v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 57 F-3d 385, 390 (4th Cir. 1995); see also Flournoy,
supra note i (explaining that debts are not erased via the abolition of a municipal
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statutorily provide that a municipality may dissolve only if plans are made for
its obligations.s7 Most often, states statutorily grant the lowest level of
government (the county or county subdivision) the power to levy taxes to pay
off debts." Postdissolution tax mechanisms (including special taxing districts
and new special-purpose service districts) can be used to ensure that
contractual obligations are met.s9
Most states with provisions to levy taxes to pay for a dissolved
municipality's indebtedness specify that only territory within the geographical
limits of the extinct entity may be taxed to provide funds to pay off the
disincorporated city's liabilities.6 o This raises key research questions for
economists about the impact of such districts on property values and locational
choices by businesses and residents. In addition, postdissolution protection for
creditors and counties (e.g., a tax levy mandated to fund a dissolved city's debt
service) would raise procedurally complex and surely controversial legal issues
in states with property tax caps and/or tax-consent laws. In such cases, a
boundary agency, approving court, or state agency would likely condition
approval of the dissolution on voters' approval of the necessary taxes alongside
their approval of the dissolution.61
corporation, because the Federal Constitution does not allow state governments to infringe
on personal property); Comment, supra note 1.
57. See, e.g., KY. REV. STAT. ANN. 5 81.096 (LexisNexis 2010) (providing that a city cannot be
dissolved "until ... provision for equitable . . . discharge of all obligations of the city" is
made); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 3o-A, 5 7205 (2010) (requiring that a municipality's
dissolution plan provide for the liabilities of the municipality); N.D. CENT. CODE 5 40-53.1-
04 (2009) (requiring that provisions be made for the payment of a municipality's current
indebtedness, contracts, and obligations before dissolution).
58. See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. 5 33:264 (2011); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. 55 74.20, 113.19
(West 20o6); MISS. CODE ANN. § 21-1-57 (2007); MONT. CODE ANN. § 7-2-4918 (2009);
NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 265.050 (LexisNexis 2011); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 3-4-9 (LexisNexis
2010); TENN. CODE ANN. 5 6-52-101 (2011); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 35.07.260 (West
2011).
5. See, e.g., DISSOLUTION STUDY COMM., supra note 12, at 14; Charles Zettek Jr., Village of
Speculator-Dissolution Plan and Options for Shared Services, CTR. FOR GOVERNMENTAL
RESEARCH 8-9 (20o8), available at http://www.cgr.org/reports/o8_R-1534
VillageofSpeculatorDissolution.pdf.
6o. See, e.g., ARz. REv. STAT. ANN. S 9-o2(D) (2010); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 30-A, 5 7205;
MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. §5 74.20, 113-19; Miss. CODE ANN. 5 21-1-57; MONT. CODE ANN.
5 7-2-4918; NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. 5 265.o5o(1)(e).
61. For a careful, albeit preliminary analysis of this legal question under California law, see John





Mention creditors these days in the context of struggling cities, and the
question of public employees and the status of collective bargaining
agreements is sure to follow. Would public employee contractual rights attach
to the county, or is dissolution a means to liquidate such agreements? Here too,
legal analysis remains preliminary, hypothetical, and sure to be contested in the
event of dissolution by cities with unfunded pension liabilities. Some state
supreme courts have held that employment contracts are distinguishable from
other forms of public contracting, while others hold that collective bargaining
agreements are binding contracts." Alongside these rules is the consideration
that the constitutional interdiction against the impairment of contracts is not
absolute and may be limited by the police power,6 as well as recent case law
(which, at most, would constitute persuasive authority) finding that collective
bargaining rights terminate during a municipal bankruptcy.# One analysis of
the question under California law found that a disincorporation would leave
public employees with valid claims of default against the city's assets.6 , As to
any claim to ongoing employment, the analysis projected that California
statutory law would not include any right to remain employed.66
Why is dissolution law so poorly developed and understood? Perhaps
dissolution is not an answer to excess government spending. Perhaps counties
and townships cannot bring costs down. Maybe population size is the only
relevant criterion for gauging the desirability of dissolution. But how would we
know? Longitudinal analysis of the fiscal and administrative impacts of city
dissolutions over time is simply not available. Perhaps the content and content
gaps in dissolution law are better explained by thoughtlessness than by reason.
Or perhaps we have the rules we do because strong associations of cities seek to
protect their constituent governments (and politicians) from citizen mutiny. In
62. Compare Stone v. Old Bridge Twp., 543 A.2d 431, 436 (N.J. 1988) (distinguishing
employment contracts from other public contracts), with Voters for Responsible Ret. v. Bd.
of Supervisors, 884 P.2d 645, 655 (Cal. 1994) (applying the longstanding rule that collective
bargaining agreements become binding once approved by the city).
63. See City of El Paso v. Simmons, 379 U.S. 497, 508 (1965); see also U.S. Trust Co. v. New
Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 25 (1977) (finding that an impairment may be constitutional if "reasonable
and necessary to serve an important public purpose").
64. See NLRB v. Bildisco, 465 U.S. 513, 516 (1984) (holding that a collective-bargaining
agreement is an "executory contract" subject to rejection by a debtor-in-possession, and that
a debtor-in-possession may unilaterally modify or terminate one or more provisions of the
agreement after filing for Chapter ii bankruptcy); In re City of Vallejo, 432 B.R. 262, 270-75
(E.D. Cal. 2010) (applying Bildisco analysis to a Chapter 9 municipal bankruptcy).
6s. See Knox & Hutchison, supra note 61, at 4-5-
66. Id.
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any event, we do not know. In an era of local fiscal crisis and citizen
disengagement, the failure to inquire is a mistake.
C. Distinguishing Bankruptcy
Mend it, don't end it. In the crudest terms, that is the municipal
bankruptcy versus dissolution difference. Federal municipal bankruptcy
(Chapter 9 of the Bankruptcy Code) purports to offer a fresh start for the
municipal corporation, not its termination (or even its mandatory
restructuring).68 Municipal bankruptcy is built on the premise that "the city
will emerge from bankruptcy in the same form-with the same boundaries,
resources, functions, and governing structure-with which it entered
bankruptcy." 6  Under current law, bankruptcy and dissolution are thus
independent, alternative, or sequential routes available to a struggling
municipality, both of which are voluntary. This Section provides an
introduction to municipal bankruptcy in order to better understand what
dissolution law is and is not able to do for a struggling city.
Chapter 9 is built on the theory that mounting debt can create a downward
economic spiral: if the share of a city's revenues devoted to debt service climbs
too high, the city will lose taxpayers and economic activity because tax rates are
high and services are poor. 7 o As revenues slip further, the share of revenues
compelled into debt service will continue to mount. Consider the City of
Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, which unsuccessfully sought bankruptcy
protection.' The City Controller had described a bind in which accumulating
additional debt would be impossible and unwise, a "fire sale" on city property
would drain future revenue from the city, and increased taxes would make it
cheaper for the city's population to head out to the suburbs. 2 Other than a
67. To support research and legal development on these issues will be crucial. Section IV.D,
infra, outlines key research questions.
68. In that way, municipal bankruptcies are more like individual bankruptcies than corporate
bankruptcies-in the latter case, the primary concern is the most efficient use and
configuration of the firm's assets, and that goal typically requires a fundamental
restructuring of the firm itself. McConnell & Picker, supra note 1, at 469-70.
69. Id. at 427.
70. Id. at 470.
71. Katy Stech & Kelly Nolan, Harrisburg Bankruptcy Filing Voided, WALL ST. J., Nov. 25, 2011,
http://online.wsj.com/article/SBiooo1424o52970203764804577058741020977490.html.
72. lanthe Jeanne Dugan & Kris Maher, Muni Threat: Cities Weigh Chapter 9, WALL ST. J., Feb.





state bailout (which the city received in September 2010, to stabilize borrowing
costs for other municipalities in Pennsylvania), bankruptcy protection seemed
like the city's only option. As widely reported in the national media,
unprecedented numbers of cities are publicly and formally exploring
bankruptcy, and Jefferson County, Alabama, recently filed the largest Chapter
9 case in history.
Bankruptcy and dissolution are independent measures in part because
Congress may not involve the federal judiciary in dissolution of a
municipality.' Chapter 9 of the Bankruptcy Code, which governs municipal
bankruptcy, does not require dissolution if a municipality files for bankruptcy
(indeed, bankruptcy itself is wholly voluntary) . Furthermore, if and when a
municipality chooses to file for bankruptcy, the rights of the municipal debtor
to manage its internal affairs without a trustee or supervisor are preserved.i
Section 904 provides that the bankruptcy court may not interfere with "the
political or governmental powers of the [municipal] debtor," nor with the
city's assetsn - provisions held to mean that a bankruptcy court "may not order
reductions in expenditure, sale of property, renegotiation of contracts, or
increase in taxes."' These rules are notably distinct from private bankruptcy,
where a creditor may force a private corporation to declare bankruptcy,7 9 a
court may force a private entity filing bankruptcy to dissolve or reorganize in a
73. See, e.g., id.; Roger Lowenstein, Broke Town, U.S.A., N.Y. TIMES MAG., Mar. 3, 2011,
http://www.nytimes.com/2o11/o3/o6/magazine/o6muni-t.html; Kelly Nolan, Largest
Municipal Bankruptcy Filed, WALL ST. J., Nov. 10, 2011, http://online.wsj.com/article/
SBIoooo1424 o529702o4 2246o 4 5770284 91526654090.html.
74. McConnell & Picker, supra note 1, at 428 ("[T]he fundamental premises of current law were
shaped by pre-1938 constitutional considerations: the Contracts Clause explains why we
have a federal bankruptcy statute for municipalities (instead of leaving the matter to state
law), while the principle of state autonomy explains its narrow scope (in contrast to private
bankruptcy law).").
75. See 11 U.S.C. §5 109(c), 303(a) (2006); McConnell & Picker, supra note 1, at 455.
76. McConnell & Picker, supra note 1, at 462.
77. 11 U.S.C. 5 904. The relevant provision provides:
Notwithstanding any power of the court, unless the debtor consents or the plan
so provides, the court may not, by any stay, order, or decree, in the case or
otherwise, interfere with- (1) any of the political or governmental powers of the
debtor; (2) any of the property or revenues of the debtor; or (3) the debtor's use
or enjoyment of any income-producing property.
78. McConnell & Picker, supra note 1, at 474.
79. Id. at 463.
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prescribed manner,So and a court generally appoints a trustee to control the
affairs of a private debtor.
The independence of bankruptcy and dissolution as remedial measures is
reciprocally reinforced on the dissolution side as well. Choosing dissolution
offers no fresh start in most states: a dissolving city will take its debt with it in
the form of a special taxing district." For that reason, we would expect that
bankruptcy is presumptively better suited to cities staggering under the weight
of debt. Dissolution makes more sense for cities outside of a debt crisis, either
before one or after one, or facing other forms of fiscal distress. While
dissolution might offer cost savings (fewer political staff and employees,
service consolidation, the sale of real property assets, etc.) to any city, whether
deep in debt or not, these rules mean that a dissolving city's residents will keep
their debt service obligations yet lose the fiscal and land-use planning
autonomy that might allow them to attract new taxpayers to their territory.
The need for both debt relief and cost savings likely explains the growing
number of cities that are talking about a two-step sequence -bankruptcy's
tough-love/fresh-start followed by dissolution for slashing costs. The case of
Vallejo, California, offers a view into such a scenario. Spatially concentrated
subprime loans and plummeting housing values in 2007-2009 brought whole
neighborhoods of the city into a downward spiral of abandonment, decay, and
devaluation. Property tax revenues plunged and out-of-budget pension
liabilities grew with stock market contractions, sending the city into fiscal
So. Id.
81. Id. at 462. While current law does not permit mandatory dissolution under Chapter 9, a
bankruptcy court's powers may be greater than they seem: Michael McConnell and Randal
Picker have argued that an "aggressive [bankruptcy] court" may be able to force the
redesign of the city's plan for adjustment of its debt in such a way that the city would be
required to change its taxing, spending, and asset management practices. Id. at 474. They
also argue that municipal bankruptcy law should be rewritten to respond to cities in "grave
need of reorganization" due to population losses, local poverty, decline in tax revenue, and
increasing service demands. Id. at 471. Bankruptcy law, they argue, could "force politically
unpopular, but sensible, decisions such as elimination of municipal functions, privatization,
and changes in tax law," where such changes have proven otherwise unworkable through
ordinary democratic politics. Id. at 472-73. Among other changes, they believe that
dissolution should be on the table. While their suggestion is appealing, it relies on the
assumption that a bankruptcy court can develop the expertise and information to determine
what those missing "sensible decisions" would be, and that such decisions do in fact exist.
In a corporate bankruptcy, a court has a much wider range of options for restructuring
within realistic constraints; when it comes to a city like Vallejo, there is only so much a court
could do to affect the local market for housing and other revenue generators. Nonetheless,
their proposal to make dissolution and reorganization part of the municipal bankruptcy
process warrants further study.




shock. The city predicted that its deficit for the 2008-2009 fiscal year was at
least $10,701,38o The city declared bankruptcy, and that move required such
dramatic cost-cutting that less than a year later the city was also discussing
dissolution. News articles reported on the dissolution option, describing
bluntly: "Vallejo could cease to exist as a municipal entity. Or it could close half
its existing fire stations.""' It was not the only city to have considered both
disincorporation and bankruptcy. The cities of East Palo Alto and San Juan
Bautista in California, Macks Creek in Missouri, Westminster in Texas, and
other cities have done the same."s The relationship of bankruptcy and
dissolution thus warrants careful consideration by scholars of public economics
and law.
Dissolution has been missing from our understanding of American urban
change and the legal rules that shape it, perhaps because we have assumed
urbanization to be a progression rather than, for some cities, a life cycle. State
codes on the matter reflect this misunderstanding. They are immature and out-
of-date, often treating dissolution law as if it need only apply to ghost towns.
Just as dissolution has been largely invisible in law and theory, so too is it
burdened by gaps in our records and collective memory. Parts II and III restore
dissolution's place in urban history, teaching us the character and scale of
dissolved and dissolving cities.
II. WHERE, WHEN? OUR MUNICIPAL GRAVEYARD
In living rooms and legislatures across the country, dissolution campaigns
are murmuring. The records gathered for this Article indicate that more
83. In re City of Vallejo, No. 20o8-26813, 20o8 WL 4146015, at *3 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. Aug. 29,
2008).
84. Jessica A. York, Vallejo Budget Shortfall Leaves No Good Options, TIMEs-HERALD (Vallejo,
Cal.), Mar. 26, 2009.
85. See, e.g., Tiara M. Ellis, Westminster Residents To Decide the City's Future, DALL. MORNING
NEWS, July 28, 2004, at 8B; Former "Speed Trap" Town To Circulate Petitions To
Disincorporate, KAN. CITY STAR, Nov. 5, 2004; Ken Hoover, Tax Struck Down-East Palo Alto
Plots Next Step, S.F. CHRON., Feb. 8, 1996, http://articles.sfgate.com/1996-02
-08/news/17767364_I-tax-structure-appeals-court-city-services; Residents Take Over After
City Dismisses Its Staff N.Y. TIMEs, Dec. 22, 1992, http://www.nytimes.com/
19 9 2/12/27/us/residents-take-over-after-city-dismisses-its-staff.html; Detwiler et al., supra
note 41 (describing the consideration of dissolution in East Palo Alto and San Juan
Bautista).
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municipalities dissolved in the past fifteen years than at any time before that.
Many more have scheduled elections that could pull their plug. This Part
develops a working research definition of dissolution activity and introduces
this Article's rough-draft list of dead, dying, and survivor American cities,
which are enumerated in the Appendices. These lists range across geography,
from metropolitan cities to rural ghost towns, and across time, from the Great
Depression to our current Great Recession.
Where and when are our first steps in understanding these dissolutions.
"Where" gives us critical information about the geographic distribution of the
phenomenon, which, in turn, provides a basis for exploring law and
institutional design in states where dissolutions are occurring and not
occurring. It facilitates future research regarding which kinds of local
institutions (e.g., villages, cities, towns?) have been targeted for elimination,
the characteristics of dissolving cities (small, large, rich, poor?) and what kinds
of state laws are enabling dissolution (e.g., the procedural requirements for
triggering a public vote on dissolution). "When" (the year of each dissolution)
may suggest hypotheses regarding broader national patterns and causal
dynamics. For instance: Can we identify temporal clusters of dissolutions, and
do these align with state or national changes like the foreclosure crisis or a
sharp drop in federal grants to local governments? This Part, along with Part
III and the Appendices, provide national findings along the dimensions of
geography and time, and they frame an analytical foundation for
understanding dissolution activity.
The purpose of this expedition into our cities and their history warrants an
explanation. I have two intentions here. The first is to provide a definitional
baseline, early findings, and dimensions of interest that may serve as a
foundation for future empirical research on dissolution. From this base,
scholars of history, political science, urban theory, sociology, and economics
can build our understanding of this important mode of managing urban
distress. My second purpose is to read the landscape of dissolutions past,
present, and planned as a basis for responsive and well-grounded normative
analysis of dissolution law in this Article and in future work by myself and
others.
A. The Range ofDissolution Activity
As a first step, we need a universe of "dissolution activity" to investigate.
To limit this pool to finalized dissolutions would be overly narrow, as we learn
something about the prospects and conditions of local government elimination
whether or not a dissolution effort is ultimately successful. And to influence




scope of all meaningful engagements with dissolution, including cities where
dissolution efforts are inchoate or in process. Dissolution activity thus should
include four categories: approved, rejected, legally proposed, and inchoate. The
methodology in Appendix A provides formal definitions for each of these
categories.
Dissolution activity is captured in surprisingly few centralized lists. For
approved dissolutions, fragmented official records are stored here and there,
and the present Article has compiled dozens of these federal and state sources
to assemble a research base. Rejected and pending dissolution activity is harder
to trace; however news media, state-based think tanks, and local-regional
historians provided a partial view of cities where dissolution is or was an
option. A multi-step inquiry of census data, state-based lists, and news archives
gives a landscape of dissolution activity, including city names, state, and date
information. Appendix B, which lists dissolved cities, is not date-limited,
though the likelihood of omissions increases before 1957 for three reasons: the
absence of U.S. census records, the decreasing availability of state records, and
problems of access to what historical records have been maintained. In
addition, the further back in history one moves, the greater the difficulty of
distinguishing legal cities from settled places, due to shifting legal definitions
of cityhood itself.86 Appendices C, D, and E, which capture other forms of
dissolution activity, are all limited to the period of time reliably covered in the
news archive. The methodology in Appendix A explains the process I used to
build these lists, available sources for data, and known gaps in that information
base.
While dissolution's invisibility in official records hampered the process of
identifying dissolution activity, its invisibility paradoxically may have helped
when it came to media research. Because most journalists have believed (or
have been told) that dissolutions happen rarely, if ever,1 dissolution activity
generates media coverage when it occurs. Specific dissolution campaigns in
86. Particularly in Western states, home to many a storied ghost town, distinguishing legal
cities from settlements without legal identity would require state-specific legal histories of
the institution of cityhood itself- a project that I commend to legal historians. Such work
would raise intriguing questions about how legal cities develop, and it will reveal the ways
that people build the structure of civil governance from the ground up. From pinning a
badge on a man to name him sheriff or mayor to registering a town with state or territorial
offices, actions to build law and government in these places will invite an interesting
assessment of where cityhood begins.
87. Many of the hundreds of media articles reviewed in research for the present Article referred
to a dissolution campaign in a particular city as if it were the first in a generation or more,
despite the fact that many such changes were being considered across the country at the
same time.
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cities too small to make the news for just about any other reason surfaced in the
national media (often with attention from several major outlets at once)
because the reporters viewed dissolution as a fascinating, surprising oddity.88
As a result, the reliability of media-based research may be higher than for other
types of local government changes, apart from the caveat that some areas are
not well-served by any kind of news outlet, or at least not one included within
the extensive LexisNexis and Newsbank (Access World News) archives.9
B. Observations
Appendix B identifies 690 dissolutions in thirty-eight states, with specific
dissolutions dating back to the early nineteenth century. It is a wide-ranging
list in terms of both time and geography. Every region of the country is
represented, with the highest numbers of recorded dissolutions in Georgia,
New York, Kentucky, Missouri, South Dakota, North Dakota, and Florida.
The number of dissolved cities is much higher than one would expect given
dissolution's shadowy presence in local government law. Yet even this list is
undoubtedly an understatement of the phenomenon. I attempted to exclude all
mergers or horizontal reorganizations from Appendix B, as well as any ghost
towns memorialized by historians where legal incorporation and legal
disincorporation under the terms of that state's law could not be verified.
There is also a high likelihood that this data is missing many cities (if not
entire states) where dissolutions occurred but were not listed in reasonably
available records, as described in Appendix A.
Records of other forms of dissolution activity are date-limited to reflect the
years covered in the news archive or the character of that category itself.
Rejected dissolutions in Appendix C (defined here as those dissolutions that
88. Dissolution campaigns in Maine and Missouri towns of fewer than oo people illustrate
this point. On Sherman and Benedicta, Maine (with populations of about 1000 and 225,
respectively), see, for example, Jerry Harkavy, Small Maine Towns Looking to Dissolution for
Tax Relief Bos. GLOBE, Dec. 13, 1987, at 97; The Maine Town That Wants To Die, N.Y.
TIiEs, Dec. 20, 1987, http://www.nytimes.com/1 9 87/12/2o/us/the-maine-town-that-wants
-to-die.html; and Maine Town, Toppled by Tax Load, Hands Over Burden but Not Identi[t]y,
N.Y. TIMEs, May 31, 1987, http://www.nytimes.com/1987/05/31/us/maine-town-toppled
-by-tax-load-hands-over-burden-but-not-identify.html [hereinafter Toppled by Tax Load].
On Macks Creek, Missouri (with a population of about 270 people), see Kelly Wiese, Mo.
Town To Vote on Dissolving; Macks Creek Tries To Outrun Its Reputation as a Speed Trap,
WASH. POST, Jan. 2, 2005, at Ao7; Kelly Wiese, Once a Speed Trap, Town Is Counting Down,
L.A. TIMES, Jan. 16, 2005, http://articles.latimes.com/2005/jan/16/news/adna-macksl6
[hereinafter Wiese, Once a Speed Trap]; and All Things Considered: Decision of Macks Creek,
Missouri To Disincorporate (NPR radio broadcast Nov. 16, 2004).




were formally, legally proposed and then failed to achieve the requisite consent
or approval) are limited to the recent period of 1970-2011. The City of Miami,
discussed in Parts I and III, is the most notable city on this list, which includes
unsuccessful dissolution elections in cities in Colorado, Florida, Illinois,
Kentucky, Maine, Missouri, New York, Ohio, and Wisconsin.
Legally proposed, pending dissolutions (20o8-20oo) are captured in
Appendix D, a list that indicates dissolution's most current frontier. We can
think of this list as a research audience in addition to a research subject, as
these are some of the places that have the most to gain from a rich and serious
analysis of dissolution law. Pending dissolution activity surfaces primarily in
New York, where a number of villages have commenced official dissolution
proceedings, either by commissioning a dissolution plan or by scheduling an
election on the question. California, Florida, Tennessee, and Utah also have
pending dissolutions.
Appendix E, inchoate dissolutions, further validates this finding that
dissolution is becoming more prominent as a policy option. Beyond those cities
that formally undertook dissolution measures (as captured in Appendices B to
D), Appendix E lists thirty-seven additional cities where citizens have launched
petition drives that ultimately failed or officials have publicly considered
dissolution between 1970 and the present. This list reveals dissolution's
salience as an option in local government boundary change in addition to its
rhetorical or strategic uses in local government management. Big cities appear
on this list, like Oakland and East Palo Alto in California. Along with other
forms of boundary change or local policy, advocacy for dissolution can be used
to make a larger point, such as to emphasize the degree of financial peril facing
a city. Or talk of dissolution can serve as a guise for a different policy objective;
for example, a councilmember might call for dissolution in order to raise public
tolerance of a more modest cut to services or spending. Talk of dissolution in
Vallejo, California had this character. A City Manager reported to the City
Council and the public that if voters refused to approve a utility tax renewal on
an upcoming ballot, "the city should consider dissolution, 'because the city of
Vallejo would be too dangerous to live in."' Finally, those cities where the
idea never gets off the ground can teach us something about the reasons not to
dissolve, even when a city has faced the degree of adversity capable of
triggering consideration of dissolution in the first place. 9 '
go. Jessica A. York, Vallejo Budget Shortfall Leaves No Good Options, TIMEs-HERALD (Vallejo,
Cal.), Mar. 26, 2009 (quoting the City Manager).
g. In New York, the municipalities that belong in this category are: Albion, Angola,
Baldwinsville, Bergen, Blasdell, Brewster Village, Buffalo, Cleveland, Corinth, Cortland,
Depew, Endicott, Farnham, Greater Binghamton, Kemore, Lancaster, Le Roy, Lyndonville,
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There is little question that dissolution is a phenomenon whose time has
not yet run. Combining Appendices B, C, and D in the modern window
covered in all of them (1970-2010), a striking spike in dissolution activity
occurs in the 1990s and 2000s. These records show meaningful but modest
numbers of cities that dissolved or rejected dissolution prior to that point: the
1970s had nineteen incidents of dissolution activity, and the 198os had sixty
such incidents. In the 199os, the number of cities with dissolution activity
jumped to 326 (reflective in part of a legislative change in Georgia that
accounted for 188 dissolutions). Since 2000, a total of 201 cities have seen
dissolution activity.
C. The New York Experiment
Five hundred sixty-six municipalities in New Jersey?" Forty-five police
chiefs in a single New York county?9" In the face of fiscal crisis, Michigan, New
Jersey, Iowa, and many other states have seen advocacy and policy measures to
systematically reduce the number of local governments through consolidation
and elimination of particular local agency forms.9 4 Such policies are arguably
furthest along in New York, where reforms have emphasized thinning the
Mobius, Naples, New Hyde Park, Orchard Park, Salem, Sloan, Tioga, Wellsville, and
Williamsville. See Appendix E.
92. David Kocieniewski, A Wealth ofMunicipalities, and an Era of Hard Times, N.Y. TIMES, May
29, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/o5/31/nyregion/31merge.html.
93. Plan for Cutting Town Taxes: Eliminate the Town Itself, N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 17, 1992,
http://www.nytimes.com/1992/02/17/nyregion/plan-for-cutting-town-taxes-eliminate-the
-town-itself.html (referring to towns in Westchester County, New York).
94. Targets of criticism and reform have ranged from tiny suburbs in New Jersey to
depopulated rural cities in Iowa, but the common cause is excessive local fragmentation into
tiny governments. Reform efforts have included calls for dissolution of all municipalities
within small counties in Iowa (referred to there as countywide consolidation), state-led
commissions in New Jersey and Illinois charged with identifying local governments
appropriate for consolidation, and the dissolution of all or some township governments
(through vertical consolidation with constituent municipalities) in Michigan. See Mike
Alberti, If It's Broke, Why Not Fix It?, REMAPPING DEBATE (Mar. 30, 2011),
http://wvww.remappingdebate.org/article/if-its-broke-why-not-fix-it?; Editorial, Census
Results Boost Consolidation Efforts in Iowa, GLOBE GAZETTE (Mason City, Iowa), Feb. 17, 2011,
http://globegazette.com/news/opinion/editorial/article-el546680-3a5d-ileo-864l-oolcc4co3286
.html; Illinois' Local Governments To Get Review, STATE J.-REG. (Springfield, Ill.), Aug. 13,
2011, http://www.sj-r.com/breaking/illinois-local-governments-to-get-review; Michigan
1o.o: Should Cities and Townships Merge To Save Money?, GRAND RAPIDS PREss (Mich.), May
21, 2010, http://www.mlive.conVnews/index.ssf/2o1o/o5/msu-governmental expert townsh
.html; Alex Schuman, Population Shifis, Budget Woes May Bring Consolidation of Local




number of municipalities through dissolution. The state has seen nearly two
decades of top-down and bottom-up efforts to dissolve village governments,
most recently culminating in major statewide legislative reform initiated by
Governor Andrew Cuomo during his tenure as Attorney General and
pavement-pounding by an entrepreneurial crusader named Kevin Gaughan in
Western New York. Dissolution activity in the state, which draws on
antigovernment, anti-tax animus as well as technical efficiency arguments,
showcases dissolution as a public-policy objective.
To understand New York's dissolution reforms requires a brief interlude to
introduce the state's cast of four general-purpose local governments: counties,
towns, cities, and villages. Land in New York falls within one of the following
arrangements, ranging as a general matter from the more rural to the more
urban: (1) a town and a county; (2) a village, town, and county; or (3) a city
and a county." New York's dissolution efforts seek to reduce the number of
New Yorkers who live in the second category; in other words, eliminate a large
number of villages and convert that territory into town/county jurisdiction
alone. Villages are incorporated municipal subdivisions like cities, but unlike
cities, they lie within town borders. 6
All that adds up to more than 10,500 governments in the state.9 7 As New
York's Attorney General, Andrew Cuomo called the state's local government
system a "ramshackle mess," stating bluntly: "[O]ur system of local
government is broken.", 8 Sounding a theme that featured prominently in his
g. A few further details are warranted. State law in New York mandates county government,
and all land in the state falls within a county. Each borough of New York City is a county,
though boroughs are subordinate to New York City government and have functioning
borough rather than county governments. See N.Y. STATE, DEP'T OF STATE, LOCAL
GOVERNMENT HANDBOOK 39 (6th ed. 2009) [hereinafter N.Y. HANDBOOK], available at
http://www.dos.state.ny.us/LG/publications/LocalGovernment Handbook.pdf. Counties
are subdivided into towns, which are also mandatory under state law. With only one
exception, these town boundaries exclude cities and Indian reservations, i.e., cities are not
subordinate to towns and land lies in either a city or a town. Id. at 51.
96. Id. at 67. Cities are incorporated places governed by charters; they enjoy the highest degree
of autonomy and home-rule authority in the system. Formally there is no minimum
population size and no means for a village to "progress" into a city through growth, though
as a practical matter cities are the more populous municipal corporations. Id. at 51. Thus it is
cities and villages that are voluntary under state law -they may be created or dissolved by
the will of their residents.
97. A New N.Y.: A Blueprint To Reform Government, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GEN.,
http://www.reformnygov.com/about.html (last visited Sept. 13, 2011).
98. Id.
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successful 2010 gubernatorial race,99 Cuomo decried the inefficiencies created
by the state's "overlapping governments," and their "layer upon layer of taxing
structures" that burdened state residents with "the highest local property tax
burden in the nation.""oo To reduce what he saw as a dysfunctional degree of
fragmentation in the state and intolerable tax levels, he led and signed major
statewide legislation to enable local government dissolution: the New N.Y.
Government Reorganization and Citizen Empowerment Act, effective March
21, 2010."o Press releases after the law's passage claimed that the new law
would simplify a formerly "Byzantine and cumbersome process of
consolidating local governmental entities."o 2
The law tried to loosen procedures for the dissolution of villages and
special districts. The new rules permit either a governing body or the electorate
to commence dissolution proceedings, 03 and they reduce the number of
signatures required on a dissolution petition from 33% to io% of the
electorate. 0 4 A referendum then follows in either case, with a majority
standard for approval.'0 s The law also requires a formal dissolution plan that
covers the fate of village employees, the quantity and disposition of assets and
liabilities, future municipal services, a period of legal transition in the village's
regulations, and a cost estimate.o0 The town absorbing the dissolved village
assumes its debts, liabilities, and obligations, along with the right to charge
debt service to taxable property within the former boundaries of the dissolved
99. See Record of Success: Consolidating Local Governments, ANDREWCUOMO.COM,
http://www.andrewcuomo.com/record-of success (last visited Sept. 13, 2011) (describing
leadership on local consolidation).
100. A New N.Y., supra note 97.
101. N.Y. GEN. MUN. LAW §§ 750-793 (McKinney 2010).
102. Press Release, Office of the Attorney Gen., Attorney General Cuomo Applauds New York
State Senate Passage of Historic Government Consolidation Measure To Reduce Waste and
Save Taxpayer Money (June 3, 2009), http://www.ag.ny.gov/media-center/2009/june/
june3c-09.html.
103. N.Y. GEN. MUN. LAW § 7 7 3 .
104. Under the new law, electors initiating dissolution must submit a petition with the
signatures of the lesser of lo% of the number of the village's electors or five thousand
electors (or, in the case of villages with 500 or fewer electors, the petition must include
signatures of at least 20% of the electors). Id. § 779(2).
105. Id. § 781(2). The new rules empower electors to seek court-ordered dissolution if a
governing body fails to proceed with dissolution following an affirmative referendum. Id.
5 786.
106. Id. §§ 774, 782. If dissolution is initiated by the governing body, the dissolution plan must
be prepared before the referendum takes place; if it is initiated by electors, the governing




entity."o Not content with legislative facilitation, the New York Department of
State established a Local Government Efficiency Grant Program to fund
dissolution plans across the state-thus bearing the procedural costs of
dissolution at the state level-as well as a proactive public help station with
which to motivate and support grassroots dissolution campaigns."'
The politics of the Act, and the gubernatorial race that followed it,
expressed a bipartisan swell of anger over New Yorkers' property tax burdens.
The appropriate state response to those burdens, however, was highly
contested. In the governor's race, the Republican candidates sought tax relief
through tax caps and constitutional controls, while Cuomo focused on
structural reform through defragmentation and dissolution.'09 The Association
of Towns for the State of New York "vehemently opposed" Cuomo's Act,
warning that the promise of tax reductions through local government
consolidation was a mirage, or at least unproven."o Any tax savings from
consolidation, it said, were due to a loss of jobs and services, and the state
property tax burden was not due to local government fragmentation."' The
Association thus proposed a variety of procedural barriers to slow dissolutions
down, from increased petition and consent requirements to increased time to
study dissolution."' What was really at issue in this opposition? What did
towns have to lose from legislation promoting dissolution? On paper the
Association simply answered that taxpayers "should not have to pay for a
service that [they] do not receive.""' In other words, pay for what you get (and
only what you get). In the politics of towns and villages, this anti-redistributive
sentiment probably had more of a suburban/rural valence than a rich/poor one,
with towns concerned about the higher costs of providing services to more
populous villages that might move on to town ledgers.
107. Id. 5 790.
108. Press Release, Office of the Attorney Gen., supra note 102.
log. Cuomo's Republican opponent in the general election was Carl Paladino; Rick Lazio was a
second major candidate in the Republican primary. See Carl on the Budget, Spending and
Taxes, PALADINO FOR THE PEOPLE, http://www.paladinoforthepeople.com/issuedetail.php
?id=4 (last visited Aug. 19, 2011); see also Building a Better New York: A Policy Agenda,
SCRIBD, http://www.scribd.com/doc/30641667/Building-a-Better-New-York (last visited
Dec. 07, 2011) (calling for changes like property tax caps, pension reforms, and higher tax
approval thresholds to address the issue of local tax burdens).
11o. G. JEFFREY HABER, Ass'N OF TowNs OF THE STATE OF N.Y., MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION 1,
3 (2009), available at http://www.nytowns.org/core/contentmanager/uploads/opposition
%20to%2olocal%2oconsolidation.pdf.
111. Id. at i.
112. Id. at 1-2.
113. Id. at 1.
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During Cuomo's tenure as Governor of New York, the path to dissolution
may get easier yet. His campaign bemoaned that local governments in the state
amount to an "oversized and inefficient bureaucracy" that constitutes "a luxury
taxpayers cannot afford."" 4 He blamed "historical accumulation" rather than
rational institutional design and planning for the current structure."' His plans
to further enable dissolution and other forms of consolidation include
automatic state-planning grants to study the effects of dissolution and legal
reform to permit New York towns to provide a broader range of municipal
services in house, i.e., without contracting for those services from districts,
villages, or counties." 6 Cutting most quickly to the heart of his property-tax-
reduction goals, he campaigned on a requirement that so% of the state aid
currently offered following dissolution and other restructuring be dedicated to
property-tax relief. 7
While Cuomo is at work in the State House, something in between a
reformist crusade and a "suburban riot" is underway at the local level."" An
entrepreneurial crusader named Kevin Gaughan"9 is leading an effort to strip
village government out of Erie County, New York, the home of the City of
Buffalo. Gaughan, an attorney and two-time unsuccessful candidate for a
congressional seat, is leading a passionate movement for village dissolution in
Western New York, a region struggling with postindustrial decline. The
"Super Bowl," he tells supporters, "is the elimination of all 16 villages in Erie
County."12 0 He focuses his argument for dissolution on costs and inefficiencies,
contrasting the percent of the county population within villages (9%) to the
114. ANDREW CuoMo, THE NEW NY AGENDA: A PLAN FOR ACTION 61 (20o), available at
http://www.andrewcuomo.com/system/storage/6/34/9/378/acbooldinal.pdf.
115. Id. at 82.
116. Id. at 87, 90-91.
117. Id. at 88-89.
118. James A. Gardner, Rioting! In the Suburbs, ARTvoICE, Feb. 25, 2010, http://artvoice.com/
issues/v9n8/riotingin-the suburbs.
nig. I interviewed Kevin Gaughan in Buffalo, New York on November 12 and 13, 2010. I am
grateful to him for his time.
12o. Barbara O'Brien & Mary B. Pasciak, Hamburg Voters Cut Town Board from 5 to 3; Eliminating
Villages Could Be Next Fight, BUFFALO NEWS, Nov. 18, 2009, http://www.buffalonews.com/
incoming/article22o72.ece; see also Kevin Gaughan, Ending the Age ofLarge Local Government,
THECOST.ORG (July 9, 2008), http://thecost.wordpress.com/ending-the-age-of-large-local
-government. Gaughan's blog provides a history of his efforts, including various
conferences and forums on regionalism and directed campaigns for downsizing and
dissolution. See About Kevin Gaughan, THECOST.ORG, http://www.thecost.org/about.htm
(last visited Sept. 5, 2011); see also Niki Cervantes, Gaughan Sets His Sights on Dissolving




villages' share of county politicians (24%) and highlighting the county-wide
and village-specific costs of paying village politicians.m Village elimination as
he describes it would improve services, "place [the county] among those
successful communities unburdened by overlapping governments, reduce
taxes, free more public funds for service delivery, and most importantly,
re-connect citizens with their communities" by spurring volunteerism and
private leadership.1 2 2
On the surface, his dissolution movement looks like an antigovernment
agenda-he calls it "ending the age of large local government," and he
promises to lower taxes and costs by reducing the number of politicians and
local governments. Yet the reductions he seeks come from shrinking and
eliminating lower tiers of government, thus placing more responsibility and
taxation control in higher divisions of government (i.e., towns). This looks like
a regionalist vision, and it may well be. Gaughan, in fact, was once a vocal
proponent of a consolidated single-tier government over the City of Buffalo
and its surrounding Erie County.
In reflecting on why regionalism failed in Erie County, Gaughan blamed
the "inordinately large number of politicians" in the region.'1 He took aim
directly at this "political class,"' first proposing that every local government in
Erie County should eliminate two seats on its governing body."' He conducted
a study of local governments in Erie County that documents the ratio of
citizens to legislators in each village or town, the salaries and benefit costs of all
elected officials in that village or town, and the other uses to which such funds
could have been put, like teachers and public beaches.'12  He found that the
problem is most acute in the county's suburbs, and he offered the comparison
121. Gaughan, supra note 120.
122. Id.
123. See Kevin Gaughan, The Gaughan Plan, KEVINGAUGHAN.COM, http://web.archive.org/web/
200502o8163311/kevingaughan.com/plan.asp (last visited Sept. 5, 2on). The plan was
presented before the Erie County Legislature Government Affairs Committee in 2005.
124. Kevin Gaughan, Introduction, THECOST.ORG, http://www.thecost.org/intro.htm (last visited
Sept. 5, 2011).
125. Id.
126. Kevin Gaughan, Kevin's Proposed Solution, THECOST.ORG, http://www.thecost.org/solution
.htm (last visited Sept. 5, 2011).
127. Kevin Gaughan, The Study, THECOST.oRG, http://www.thecost.org/report.htm (last visited
Sept. 5, 2011). Gaughan articulates an interesting rationale for his downsizing agenda,
summed up in the notion that "No Drop of Rain Believes It Is Responsible for the Flood"-
the idea that politicians across the county agreed that there was too much government in the
area, but then "went on to explain why their town or village was the exception, and had just
the right number." Gaughan, supra note 120.
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that "if Buffalo had the same ratio of citizens to legislators as the suburbs, there
would be ioo [Buffalo] common council members." " The math on the costs
of local government in Erie has been called into question, as has the general
level of thoughtfulness of the downsizing movement's approach.'
Nonetheless, it is clear that Gaughan is a man on a mission to eliminate what
he sees as unaffordable, undesirable underbrush in American government.
Cuomo's bill and Gaughan's mission remain at early stages, though both
efforts have already seen successes and failures. Eight villages in New York
have approved dissolutions since 2003, compared with a total of fifty in the
twentieth century."o Among the ranks of the dissolved include the young (such
as the Village of Amchir, incorporated in 1964 and dissolved in 1968) and the
old (the Village of Pike, established in 1848 and dissolved in 2oo8).'
Following the passage of the Empowerment Act in March 2010, citizens in
seven more villages immediately called elections, but voters rejected all of
them."' Everyone seems to agree that a major factor in these rejections is a
defect in the law: dissolution plans are not prepared until after an election
called by citizen petition, and thus voters had great uncertainty about the costs
and benefits.'3 ' Both Cuomo and Gaughan have expressed ambition to plow
ahead, so legal amendments may follow soon. While it is too early to assess the
success of New York's experiment, it is nonetheless clear that citizens and
leaders in the state are looking to dissolution as a tool to modernize government,
control taxes, and manage decline.
128. Kevin Gaughan, Findings and Conclusions, THECOST.ORG, http://www.thecost.org/find.htm
(last visited Sept. 5, 2o1).
129. See Gardner, supra note 118; James Garner & Kate Foster, Sizing Up Local Legislatures,
U. BUFF. REGIONAL INST. (Sept. 2009), available at http://www.regional-institute
.buffalo.edu/Includes/UserDownloads/PolicyBrief LegisDownsizing Sepog.pdf.
130. See Appendix B.
131. See N.Y. HANDBOOK, supra note 95, at 73; Town and Village of Pike Dissolution Study,
GENESEE/FINGER LAKES REG'L PLANNING COUNCIL (Apr. 29, 2008), http://www.gflrpc.org/
Publications/Pike/PikeDissolutionStudy.htm; Appendix B.
132. See Appendix C.
133. See, e.g., Joseph Spector, Cuomo's Consolidation Plan a Work in Progress, PRESS & SUN BULL.
(Binghamton, N.Y.), Oct. 25, 2010, http://www.pressconnects.com/article/2ololo2s/




Dissolution is a small but rising trend. It should no longer be overlooked as
part of our past, and it should figure prominently in our vision of a new and
leaner era of local government.
Ill. WHY, WHY NOT? THE FACES OF MUNICIPAL DISSOLUTION
In 1848, just eleven years after the incorporation of the Village of Seneca
Falls, the suffragists of the Seneca Falls Convention signed the Declaration of
Sentiments, which contained the following passage excerpted from the
Declaration of Independence:
Prudence, indeed, will dictate that governments long established
should not be changed for light and transient causes; and accordingly
all experience hath shown that mankind are more disposed to suffer,
while evils are sufferable, than to right themselves by abolishing the
forms to which they are accustomed.3 4
In the context of the Seneca Falls Convention, the words referred, of
course, to "the patient sufferance of the women under this government" and
the demand for equality."' But they offer a powerful reminder that
governments, including local ones, are rarely cast off for trifling causes. These
words echo in Seneca Falls itself, where the citizens of the Village voted in 2010
to dissolve their local government-174 years after its founding."'
If citizens are unlikely to remove their governments for "light and transient
causes," why do dissolutions happen? And equally importantly: why do
dissolutions fail? This Part offers a foundational sorting of themes animating
dissolution activity. Drawing from the hundreds of newspaper articles
reviewed for this Article from the 1970-2010 period, as well as local and
regional histories of selected places in the Appendices prior to this period, this
Part distills five themes from the public claims made by proponents or
opponents of municipal dissolution. Within each theme, this Part checks in
with modern dissolution law to determine the way that law enables or
constrains dissolution in that context. This intersection of dissolution's history
and law builds a foundation for Section IV.C's effort to interrogate and rethink
the law of dissolution. In addition, the hypotheses and organizing principles
offered here will facilitate research design for at least two types of future
134. Declaration of Sentiments, in REPORT OF THE WOMEN'S RIGHTS CONVENTION, HELD AT
SENECA FALLS, N.Y., JULY 19TH AND 20TH, 1848, at 7 (1848).
135. Id.
136. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
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projects: first, a legal history of dissolution law, and second, comparative,
qualitative sociology or political economy analysis of how and why dissolution
becomes an option and why it is approved or rejected.
I have no doubt that behind this initial layer of research lie other important
issues and histories. The themes identified here are not exclusive. I have no
doubt that historical case studies of the cities in these Appendices will reveal
additional causal factors, including, for instance, environmental changes such
as natural disaster or drastic shifts in weather." Nor are they independent -
the remarkable diversity among cities means that some cities will dissolve (or
reject dissolution) in ways that cut across these categories. The factors
identified here are also not determinative, as dissolution lies in a range of
possible responses to severe local stress. For every case here, there exist null
cases -cities facing similar pressures that did not consider dissolution. In the
words of one historian writing in an analogous context, we should see the
pressures here not as "determinism" but as "possibilism," with the choice
between one response and another a result of human agency."'
The Graveyard of American Cities leads us to remember places of great
hardship and disappointment, where citizens deliberated carefully, perhaps
even heatedly, to bring their governments to an end, or states marked the fait
accompli of urban abandonment or political failure. When we look behind the
names of dissolved and dissolving cities, we find river port cities that once
throbbed with industry and growth; black colonies for recently emancipated
slaves yearning to own land and live beyond southern racial violence; casino
and resort boomtowns that busted; and corrupt, family-run fiefdoms. All
thrived in their day; most dwindled in population and grew in despair. Five
themes repeatedly arise in these histories: (i) decline (i.e., budgetary crisis and
depopulation due to industrial or rural abandonment), (2) taxes, or more
specifically, the rebellion against them, (3) reform to address corruption and
137. Ecological factors have become increasingly important in historical analysis, and they have
featured centrally in the literature on rural change in general and the Dust Bowl in
particular, as well as in the growth of American industrial capitals and other significant
events. See Mackil, supra note 9, at 494 (noting the increasing importance to historians of
the impact of the environment on human events). Notable titles for thinking about the role
of ecology in urban development and rural decline include WILLIAM CRONON, NATURE'S
METROPOLIS: CHICAGO AND THE GREAT WEST (1991); and DONALD WORSTER, DuST BOWL:
THE SOUTHERN PLAINS IN THE 1930S (1979).
138. See Mackil, supra note 9, at 505 (referring to the fact that under similar ecological
circumstances, one ancient Greek polis might be abandoned while another was not); see also
id. (noting, again in the context of Greek polis, "that resilience could be achieved in various
ways, and that the abandonment and disintegration of a polis should be placed on a
spectrum of responses to pressure").
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mismanagement, (4) race, in settings ranging from banishment to autonomy
to desegregation, and (5) community, or the desire to preserve neighborly
bonds and history.
A. Decline
If there is one theme at the heart of the dissolutions studied here, it is
economic decline and budgetary collapse. Within that broad category,
however, we notice important distinctions between the long-term
accumulation of systemic bad news and acute fiscal shock. The first type of
distress, the long economic slide, makes dissolution an alternative raised again
and again over the course of many years, or an option considered as layers of
bad news accumulate and ossify. Such conversations might be instigated by
some kind of economic change in which the financial fallout builds slowly-
housing values (and thus property tax revenues) fall, industries leave town,
demand for a major residential development fails to materialize, and the like.
Optimism can survive very long winters, decades in some places, until dramatic
restructuring like dissolution becomes an option. Yet as we would expect from
the literature on agenda-setting in the public-policy context, economic triggers
for dissolution activity also come from "focusing events," or abrupt shocks that
draw sudden and concentrated media attention." 9 In these places, dissolution
is precipitated by acute fiscal crisis caused by impacts from a steep fall in
housing values; a downward spike in the municipal bond rating; voter
rejection of a tax needed for solvency; closure of an industrial cornerstone of
local employment or tax revenue; and/or a sizable legal judgment against a
municipality. The dissolution activity described herein reflects and sometimes
overlaps these nodes of fiscal distress. 4 o
The recent peak of dissolution activity in Western New York represents
slow-moving economic decline and associated population loss. Op-Eds by
Kevin Gaughan in the Buffalo News have decried the region's "flat-lining
139. This literature describes a three-stage process toward creating an opening for policy change:
a focusing event or other news generates media attention, policy analysts or issue
entrepreneurs offer their preferred solution to the problem identified in the news, and
politicians or others support the solution. See FRANK R. BAUMGARTNER & BRYAN D. JONES,
AGENDAS AND INSTABILITY IN AMERICAN POLITICS (1993); JOHN W. KINGDON, AGENDAS,
ALTERNATIVES, AND PUBLIC POLICIES (1984); Steinacker, supra note 1, at 107. This literature
is poorly suited to dissolution in some contexts, where it is citizens acting in opposition to
politicians who bring the solution to the forefront.
140. One might expect an untenable municipal debt burden to be on this list as well, but as noted
in Section I.C, debt cannot be relieved through dissolution.
1401
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
pulse," 41 loss of young population,'42 and "failed local economy,"14 ' and they
have observed that "[w]hen America gets the flu" of economic malaise,
"Western New York gets cancer."'" They have described a kind of psychic
"weariness" born of economic weakness: "Ours is a wounded community. We
bear the scars of decades of losses that have sapped our strength and our
soul."s14
Economic decline and the resulting inability to sustain municipal taxes
have also animated a wave of seven small towns in Maine (some of which are
more than 150 years old) to revert to "unorganized territory" that is dependent
on county services but operated as state territory with no local government.146
However, not all dissolution elections held in the face of long-term fiscal
distress succeed. Such votes ultimately failed in Allen, Kentucky, Village of
North Bend, Ohio, and Mountain View, Colorado, where a resident described
the town's persistent state of fiscal distress in this way: "It sort of feels like a
broken leg and they keep putting Band-Aids on it, and it never heals."14 7 City
officials have argued against dissolution where they perceive the administrative
costs to be too high for an extremely depressed city to carry. For instance, in
Isleton, California, where a civil grand jury has pushed for dissolution, , 8 the
city manager told a reporter in 2009 that dissolution would cost $250,000,
leading the reporter to observe: " [Isleton] may be too poor to live, but it's also
too poor to die."' 49
In addition to these slower economic slides, singular budgetary shocks can
serve as focusing events that bring a small city to a brink of distress where
dissolution becomes an option. Such shocks might include the closure of a
mine or factory in a "company town" (as in Bibb City, Georgia), or a sizable
legal judgment (as in the City of Mesa, Washington, and Half Moon Bay,
141. Kevin Gaughan, Op-Ed., Struggling To Survive: Bloated Local Government Is Corroding Our
Sense of Self, BUFFALO NEWS, Apr. 26, 2009, at Gi.
142. Kevin Gaughan, Op-Ed., How 439 Politicians Cost Us Effective Government: And Why Paying
Them 32 Million a Year Costs Us Our Future, BUFFALO NEWS, Dec. 3, 2oo6, at Ii (describing
Erie County's loss of 30% of its twenty-five- to thirty-four-year-olds over the past decade).
143. Id. (describing falling income levels and housing values in Erie County).
144. Gaughan, supra note 141.
145. Id.
146. See, e.g., Harkavy, supra note 88; Toppled by Tax Load, supra note 88.
147. Allison Sherry, A Colorado Town in Trouble, DENVER PosT, Apr. 15, 2009, http://
www.denverpost.com/ci 12143468; see also Appendix B.
148. See infra text accompanying notes 194-197 (discussing Isleton in greater depth).
149. Maria L. La Ganga, Historic Little Sacramento County Town Has King-Size Problems, L.A.




California).' Local financing rule changes can create a similar impact. For
instance, a Missouri state legal change in 1995 that limited speeding ticket fines
crippled the budget of Macks Creek, a city located on an interstate."' In the
face of the lost revenue, the city disbanded its police department and filed for
bankruptcy in 1998, which reduced the city's debt but did not solve the long-
term fiscal malaise.' In 2004, Macks Creek residents approved an election for
disincorporation, though they ultimately rejected it at the ballot box.'
Where economic stress reaches crisis levels, whatever the cause, some states
have stepped in to impose dissolution as a penalty. The city of North Las
Vegas, Nevada, for instance, is currently facing a takeover of the city's financial
operations in the face of economic collapse, and the state legislature may
impose disincorporation as "a last resort."14 The states of Michigan and Rhode
Island have recently passed legislation that will permit those states to impose
receiverships on struggling municipalities in which the local democracy is
entirely suspended for an undefined period of time - a policy that I have
characterized as the dissolution of local democracy-even if the city's corporate
status remains intact.'
One of the first recorded dissolutions provides another interesting example
of involuntary dissolution to address economic problems. An 1879 dissolution
of the City of Mobile, Alabama, was an involuntary revocation of the city's
charter that sanctioned the city for chronic problems incurring and repaying
debt. Absent partisan rancor between the state and city, the dissolution may
iso. Bibb City dissolved through merger and was thus omitted from Appendix B, but
nonetheless, the city provides a useful referent for long-term industrial decline that
precipitates the disincorporation of a "company town." See Bibb Manufacturing Company,
THE NEw GA. ENCYCLOPEDIA, http://www.georgiaencyclopedia.org/nge/Article.jsp?id=h
-3213 (last visited Feb. 13, 2012); see also Joe Chapman, Mesa Weighs Legal Options, TRI-CiTY
HERALD (Kennewick, WA), April 30, 2009 (reporting on city research into disincorporation
and bankruptcy as responses to the budgetary shock of a legal judgment against the city);
Julia Scott, The End ofHalfMoon Bay?, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, Aug. 28, 2010 (describing
city council deliberations about disincorporation as a possible answer to dire financial straits
precipitated in part by a $15 million lawsuit settlement).
151. Wiese, Once a Speed Trap, supra note 88.
152. Former "Speed Trap" Town To Circulate Petitions To Disincorporate, KAN. CITY STAR, Nov. 5,
2004, at B3.
153. Wes Johnson, Election 2oo5: Macks Creek Residents Vote To Remain Incorporated, SPRINGFIELD
NEWS LEADER, Apr. 6, 2005, at A4.
154. David McGrath Schwartz, Commissioner: North Las Vegas Headed Toward State Takeover, LAS
VEGAS SUN, Aug. 4, 2011, http://www.lasvegassun.con/news/201/aug/o4/whats-store
-north-las-vegas.
155. Michelle Wilde Anderson, De Facto Dissolution: Radical Experimentation in State Takeovers of
Local Governments, 39 FORDHAM URB. L.J. (forthcoming 2012).
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never have occurred-historians have attributed the dissolution in part to the
desire of Democrats in the state capital to dethrone a sitting Republican mayor
in the New South.1,6 The city's dissolution led to federal case law on the
treatment of debt following dissolution. 157
Economic crises are thus common across dissolving cities. Dissolution is
seen as a way to cut costs quickly and dramatically by laying off employees and
politicians, consolidating and restructuring services and administration with
the county, selling or transferring assets, and the like. While economic malaise
is clearly a cause of dissolution, we do not yet know the circumstances, if any,
in which dissolution provides a cure.""
B. Taxes
Dissolution has become one expression of the rising antipathy to taxes,
government spending, and government regulation more generally. Policy
analyst David Stokes of the libertarian Show-Me Institute in Missouri, for
instance, has observed that disincorporation "is an important option for cities
in Missouri to consider, and for taxpayers to keep in mind, every time some
tiny city tries to enact another tax increase."" 9 Yet the politics of dissolution as
an anti-tax, antigovernment reform are in fact more complicated than that,
with calls for dissolution also coming from the political left in the name of
cutting costs through modernization and consolidation.
Anti-tax sentiment is particularly strong in cities with a municipal tax
burden that is high relative to that in the county, or where city government is
seen to be duplicative of a competent county administration. A cluster of
dissolution drives in Florida offers a case in point. In the city of Port Richey,
citizens have led seven attempts at dissolution in thirty years, with one
dissolution campaign led by a group dubbed "Port Richey Citizens for Lower
Taxes.",6o Tax comparisons between city residents and the unincorporated
156. See George Ewert, The New South Era in Mobile, 1875-19oo, in MOBILE: THE NEW HISTORY
OF ALABAMA'S FIRST CITY 127, 133-34 (Michael V.R. Thomason ed., 2001).
157. See Mobile v. Watson, 116 U.S. 289 (1886); supra note 54 and accompanying text.
158. See infra Section W.D.
i5s. David Stokes, Municipal Disincorporation in the News, SHow-ME DAILY (May 27, 2009, 1:41
PM), http://www.showmedaily.org/20o9/o5/municipal-disincorporation.html.
16o. Phil Davis, Legislators Won't Help To Disband Port Richey, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Nov. 2,
2005, http://www.sptimes.com/2oo5/11/o2/Pasco/Legislators-won-t-hel.shtml; see also





areas of the county have served prominently in the campaign,"6 with
proponents grieving "double taxation""' by the county and the city's
"redundant layer of government."'" Cedar Grove, Florida, (dissolved in 2008)
similarly emphasized tax savings under county management. Similarly situated
Florida cities are carefully watching these cities' experiences for more
information about the perils and prospects of dissolution, including the cities
of Marathon, Marco Island (where a lawsuit has erupted over city-dissolution
procedures), San Antonio, and West Park. 6 ,
Dissolution rhetoric in Texas has characterized city government as an
"unwanted bureaucracy" that imposes costly taxes. 6s Villages in Wisconsin
and Ohio saw vitriolic contests over dissolution in the name of tax reduction.
Anti-tax advocates led a campaign dubbed "Operation Eagle Freedom," a
166
so-called "tax revolt," to dissolve the Village of Eagle, Wisconsin in 2004.
They argued that town government would reduce property taxes and permit
residents to vote on any new taxes directly. 167 Dissolution proponents collected
the signatures necessary to trigger a dissolution election, though the measure
ultimately failed. 6 1
("Disbanding the City has been the political equivalent of an active volcano in Port Richey
for most of the decade, always simmering in the background, erupting every few years.").
161. Christian M. Wade, Port Richey Dissolution Case Taken to Legislators, PASCO TRIB., Nov. 2,
2005, at 1.
162. Camille C. Spencer, Port Richey City Council's Deadline Nears To Resolve Dissolution Issues,
ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Mar. 23, 2009, http://www.tampabay.com/news/localgovernment/
article986155.ece.
163. Id. (quoting a supporter of dissolution).
164. See Associated Press, Broward County Tax Reform Vote Will Decide West Park's Fate,
ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Aug. 27, 2007; David Ball, Has MARATHON Had Its Run as a City?:
Dissolution Could Be Tough, IfSupport's There, MCCLATCHY-TRIB. Bus. NEWS, Mar. 28, 2007;
Christine Girardin, Judge Rejects Public Vote on Marco's Dissolution, NAPLES DAILY NEWS,
June 23, 1999; Lorie Jewell, Residents Cool to Breakup Proposal, TAMPA TRIB., Aug. 6, 1992;
Todd Wright, As West Park's Future Hangs in the Balance, Residents and Leaders Focus on the
Floundering City's Flawed Foundation, MIAMI HERALD, Aug. 26, 2007.
165. Zeke Maccormack, Center Point Sets "Colonia" Election -Kerr County Residents To Decide on
Referendum To Disincorporate on May i, SAN ANTONIO EXPRESS-NEWS, Mar. io, 1999, at iB;
see also Appendix A (listing other disincorporated cities in Texas).
166. See, e.g., Fate of Village Up to Voters, ST. PAUL PIONEER PRESS, Mar. 3, 2004, at B2.
167. Darryl Enriquez, Push To Dissolve Eagle Rare in State's Histoty, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, Jan.
26, 2004, at Bi.
168. Kay Nolan, Eagle Board Questions Town's Role: Trustees Request Minutes from Meetings on
Village, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, April 9, 2004, at 1.
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Two incorporated suburbs of Cincinnati, Ohio, have similarly raised heated
dissolution fights. In 1998, residents of Cleves Village (founded in 1818169)
formed a group called Concerned Citizens for Lower Taxes in Cleves, later
renamed Team EFFECT (Ensuring the Financial Future and Enhancing Cleves
for Tomorrow), and led a dissolution drive that successfully qualified for
election."o The group argued that Cleves's tax rate compared unfavorably with
that of the surrounding township."' Opponents called the leaders of Team
EFFECT "Tax Nazis" and emphasized bitterly that the dissolution leaders were
relatively new residents." Team EFFECT characterized its effort as a "strike
for the little man," in which it was proving that people can "fight city hall . .. if
you just have the fortitude to do it.""' Prior to the election, local press reported
"heated talk" and "[h]undreds of signs" on the vote."' The ballot measure was
defeated 58% to 41%,'1s and dissolution gave way to consolidated town-village
services.76 A similar fight over tax rates between older and newer residents
erupted nearby in the Village of North Bend, Ohio, in 2003. News reports
suggested that dissolution was put on the ballot by the developer and residents
of a new development with home values (and thus property taxes) much
higher than those in the older part of town." The proposal was defeated, with
79% opposing dissolution."
Statewide anti-tax activism is also showing up in dissolution activity, with
taxpayer advocacy organizations now funding local ballot initiatives that may
lead to dissolution. In Damascus, Oregon, for instance, two statewide groups
(Americans for Prosperity Oregon and Taxpayers Association of Oregon)
contributed nearly $12,000 to a local group promoting four voter initiatives in
169. History of Cleves, VILL. OF CLEVES, available at http://web.archive.org/web/20100531120917/
http://www.cleves.org/history-mainmenu-38 (last updated July 13, 2009).
170. Ken Wilson, Cleves Group: Scrap Village: Lawyer Hired To Help Prepare the Petitions,
CINCINNATI POST, Mar. 19, 1998, at 2.
171. Id.
172. Rick Van Sant, Boom Puts Cleves at War with Itself, CINCINNATI POST, May 13, 1998, at 1A.
173. Voters To Decide Future of 18o-Year-Old Village, CLEVELAND PLAIN DEALER, Aug. 15, 1998, at
4 -B.
174. Villagers Feud Over Dissolving To Cut Cost, CLEVELAND PLAIN DEALER, Oct. 25, 1998, at 6-B.
175. Hamilton County Election Results: Issue 2o, Miscellaneous Question, Village of Cleves, SMART
VOTER (Nov. 3, 1998), http://www.smartvoter.org/i998nov/oh/hn/issue/2o.
176. Ken Wilson, Towns Finally Talking: Shared Services Could Cut Costs, CINCINNATI POST, Sept.
21, 1999, at IA.
177. Id.





2010 that would severely restrict the city's ability to provide public transit and
most other services.' 79 Opponents of the initiatives, which were ultimately
defeated by narrow margins,so argued that the measures would so weaken the
city's ability to provide services that the community would be forced to
disincorporate rather than sustain a powerless government."'" The taxpayer
groups had publicly supported the initiatives as pilots for similar measures
across the state.'
Proponents who argue for dissolution often frame local government and
excess taxation as perpetrators of economic decline. Here too, Western New
York demonstrates this argument connecting the number of local governments
to tax rates. Newspaper op-eds by dissolution advocate Kevin Gaughan (see
supra Section II.C) bemoan property tax rates that purportedly give Erie
County the fifth-highest rate of taxation in any American county,' with one
cuttingly suggesting that "Western New York has become a two-company
town: politicians and poverty.11S4 Such commentary has railed publicly against
a "political class" that has stymied change and innovation, including efforts at
regional government, in favor of self-preservation and political advancement. 5
"Redundancies 'R Us," one article chimed, because of responsibilities
duplicated at the village and town level.'8
While most of these calls for reducing the layers and costs of local
government evoke antigovernment animus, dissolution is not the exclusive
province of the political right. From the political left, it has been framed as a
means of progressive-style modernization of the state. In New York, as
179. Dana Tims, Is Damascus in Danger of Death by Initiative? OREGONIAN, Feb. 21, 2010,
http://www.oregonlive.com/clackamascounty/index.ssf/2olo/o2/is-damascus in-danger
of death.html.
18o. Summary Report: March 9, 201o Election Results, CLACKAMAS CNTY., http://www.co
.clackamas.or.us/elections/archives/2o0oo309.htm (last updated Mar. 19, 2010).
181. Tims, supra note 179.
182. Dana Tims, Voters in Damascus, Estacada Reject Key Initiatives, OREGONIAN, Mar. 10, 2010,
http://www.oregonlive.com/clackamascounty/index.ssf/ 2 o0/03/damascus-voters rejecting
key.html.
183. Gaughan, supra note 128. 1 did not verify this figure, but rather quote it here as an
expression of the sentiment around dissolution. Even if it is true, the ranking deserves the
caveat that the regional tax burden is unlikely to be high in any absolute sense, because
housing costs in the depressed region are extremely low.
184. Gaughan, supra note 141, at G2.
185. Gaughan, supra note 142 (describing falling income levels and housing values in Erie
County).
186. Donn Esmonde, Activist Sees Issue Ripen After 15 Years, BUFFALO NEWS, June 14, 2009,
www.buffalonews.com/incoming/article'5929o.ece.
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discussed in Section II.C, the Democratic executive and legislative branches of
state government, as well as a left-leaning grassroots leader on the ground,
have called for dissolution to reduce fragmentation in the name of
modernization, efficiency, and tax reduction. While these efforts have no doubt
been buoyed by animus against government and taxes, their leadership from
the left has more in common with modern city-county consolidation advocacy
and early twentieth-century progressive municipal reform movements-
sounding themes of "government performance," "technical efficiency"
(meaning creation of economies of scale and professional accountability
structures, and the reduction of government duplication), and a reduction in
the confusion (and thus shelter for corruption) caused by fragmentation.'8 1
These arguments both implicitly and explicitly associate size and regional scale
with efficacy and cost savings, and they target smaller units of government for
elimination. As such, they work against conservative allocative-efficiency
arguments in favor of fragmentation, including the theories of residential
preference sorting associated with Charles Tiebout.118 In other words, these
proponents see dissolution as saving public funds through defragmentation
and regionalism.
Whether dissolution is about forcibly shrinking government or making it
more effective, proponents across dissolving cities seem to agree on two things:
in times of local economic crisis, cutting taxes and spending is necessary, and
dissolution may offer a dramatic way to do just that.
C. Reform
As a sanction for corruption, or a call for new management, a citizenry riled
up about the failures of a local government delivers quite a message of reform
with a disincorporation drive, whether successful or not. Such a message can
come from the state or from voters alone; in other words, reform-oriented
dissolutions may be involuntary or voluntary.
The City of Vernon, California, is a case in point on the involuntary side. A
corruption scandal of outsized public salaries (for instance, a 2008 salary of
187. Suzanne M. Leland & Gary A. Johnson, Consolidation as a Local Government Reform: Why
City-County Consolidation Is an Enduring Issue, in CITY-COUNTY CONSOLIDATION AND ITS
ALTERNATIVES: RESHAPING THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT LANDSCAPE 29-32 (Jered B. Carr &
Richard C. Feiock eds., 2004)-
188. See id. at 32; Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. POL. ECON. 416
(1956).
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$1.65 million for one official"') and lavish self-dealing has drawn a probe by
the State Attorney General."'o In 2006, the District Attorney recommended
disincorporation as the best way to break apart the city's "fiefdom," but the
plan was declined by a civil grand jury, which determined that the matter
should go to the state legislature."' In light of new revelations of ongoing
corruption, a state assembly bill was proposed to disincorporate California
cities with fewer than 15o residents, a category that included only the City of
Vernon. 1 2 While the bill was pending, officials and businesses of the city
threatened a lawsuit contesting the constitutionality of involuntarily dissolving
a charter city, a move that allegedly disenfranchises the city's own voters."9
Involuntary dissolution has also arisen recently in Isleton, California. The
town weathered a mayoral recall; public debt amounting to about $1oo,ooo
per resident; and six different civil grand jury reports in the 1990s and 2000S
that described management improprieties and a scandal regarding the issuance
of hundreds of unlawful weapons permits.19 4 The town has less than half the
population it did at its height, with decades of economic depression dating
back to cannery closures in the 1930s and 1940s.' 9 s The grand jury reports
recommended dissolution on the basis of incompetence if not corruption, and
described the city as "in a state of perpetual crisis."' 6 Yet dissolution has so far
been held off by voters, who have told local media "[w]e're too tough to
die." 197
i8g. Sam Allen & Hector Becerra, L.A. City Council Backs Plan To Dissolve Vernon's Cityhood, L.A.
TIMES, Mar. 2, 2011, http://articles.latimes.com/20nh/mar/o2/local/la-me-0302-Vernon
-20110302-1.
19o. Kim Christensen & Sam Allen, Vernon Officials' Compensation Is Focus ofAttorney General
Probe, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 16, 2010, http://articles.latimes.com/2olo/sep/16/local/la-me
-vernon-investigation-201oo916.
191. Hector Becerra & Sam Allen, Plan To Disband Vernon Gains Steam, L.A.TIMES, Oct. 27, 2010,
http://articles.latimes.com/2010/oct/27/local/la-me-vernon-city-20o101027.
192. Sam Allen, Vernon Mounts Campaign To Squelch Legislation That Would Remove Its Cityhood,
L.A. TIMES, Dec. 30, 2010, http://articles.latimes.com/20o0/dec/3o/local/la-me-vernon
-20101230; Allen & Becerra, supra note 189.
193. Allen, supra note 192. The bill has since been rejected, and Vernon has been given a new
lease on cityhood, albeit under attentive state and local scrutiny.
194. Elaine Herscher, Delta's Toughest Town Refuses To Die: Isleton Digs In at Idea of Disbanding,
Firing City Staff S.F. CHRON., Aug. 31, 1995, http://articles.sfgate.com/1995-o8
-31/news/17814462_1-isleton-crawdad-festival-mayor-leonard-maxey; see also Loretta Kalb,
Grand jury Admonishes Isleton, SACRAMENTO BEE, Feb. 16, 20o8, at Bi.
195. Herscher, supra note 194.
196. Kalb, supra note 194.
197. Herscher, supra note 194.
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Research for this Article also identified voluntary efforts that resulted from
corruption and scandal. The Village of North Bend, Ohio, outside of
Cincinnati, saw its first of two dissolution efforts (the second of which grew up
as an anti-tax effort, discussed above) in 1994 after a corruption scandal
entangled Village officials in charges and convictions for theft in office, bribery,
and other offenses." Dissolution did not formally make it to the ballot that
year (the Village Council instead disbanded its police and fire departments),
but it resurfaced as a solution to the city's trouble a few years later.'99 Criminal
prosecution of local officials similarly triggered dissolution activity in Cedar
Grove, Florida, after a 20o6 state audit identified accounting problems.
"Elderly ladies in tennis shoes"oo led a successful dissolution campaign in 2007
that emphasized mismanagement as well as dissatisfaction with the services
provided for their taxes.2 o1 Corruption also served as a rallying cry for
dissolution in failed elections in Marathon, Florida (2007) and Foxfield,
Colorado (2002), where citizen-led campaigns emphasized that county
administrators would better manage affairs.20 2
Largest and most notable among the voluntary anticorruption campaigns
was the failed dissolution drive in the City of Miami, where a corruption
scandal was among the triggering events for a dissolution effort. In 1996, in a
scandal dubbed "Operation Greenpalm," city officials and a councilmember
were alleged to have taken kickbacks on public contracts, resulting in several
resignations and removals. These events were followed only two weeks later by
an announcement that the city's deficit had reached at least $38.9 million.2 3 As
described in Part I, proponents of Miami's dissolution had additional motives
(most prominently, to break away from the larger city and form their own
cities), but the surface of their campaign emphasized the Miami City Council's
untrustworthy and incompetent government.
198. Looking Ahead, CINCINNATI POST, Sept. 26, 1994, at 8A; Ken Wilson, North Bend Wins
Dispute Over Ex-Officer's Benefits, CINCINNATI POST, Jan. 12, 1995, at 3; Ken Wilson, There's
Big Trouble in Little River City: North Bend So Broke It's Selling Assets, CINCINNATI POST, May
12, 1994, at loA.
199. North Bend Survival Subject of Whispers: Newcomers Don't Like Taxes, CINCINNATI ENqUIRER,
Jan. 30, 1999, http://www.enquirer.com/editions/1999/o/3o/locnorth-bend.html.
200. Telephone Interview with Terrell Arline, Bay Cnty. Counsel (Sept. 22, 2010).
2oi. Ryan Burr, Residents Rip Cedar Grove Official: Commissioner Beier Knocked for Role in
Dissolution Petition, NEws HERALD (Panama City, Fla.), Aug. 15, 2007, http://
www.newsherald.com/articles/city-65495-residents-beier.html.
202. See Ball, supra note 164; Karen Rouse, Judge Upholds April 2 Vote on Whether To Dissolve
Foxfield, DENVER POST, Feb. 22, 2oo2; Robert Sanchez, Vote May Dissolve Foxfield as Town
Money, Officials'Lack ofExperience Cited, DENVER ROCKY MTN. NEws, Apr. 3, 2002.





Race surfaces in the history of dissolution in complicated, even
contradictory ways. The earliest identified role of race in dissolution was one of
expulsion -white racial violence and other measures of discrimination to expel
the population from an all-black town, leading to its disintegration.2 o4 But if
race accounts for why some cities dissolved, it also accounted for why some
cities did not. Just as cities have formed in order to achieve or preserve white
self-segregation, so too might residents hold onto cityhood over time in order
to protect racial homogeneity. In the context of majority-minority cities, racial
autonomy has been an argument for retaining cityhood despite immense
pressures to dissolve. Dissolution, this argument goes, can dilute a minority
electorate within a larger population."os Yet here too we find an interesting
complexity: dilution can also mean redistributive desegregation, with greater
racial mixing within a larger, whiter, and wealthier electorate. This Section
explores each of these dynamics, which turn on two questions. First, how has
race factored in deliberations over dissolution? Second, what does it mean to
lose cityhood in a majority-minority town? Dissolution activity in Oldahoma,
Tennessee, California, Georgia, Alabama, and Florida helps work through
these questions.
The nineteenth and twentieth centuries included a little-known history of
racial empowerment through the formation of majority-minority towns.2o
Among the most significant episodes in this history is Oklahoma's "all-black
towns" movement, a wave of incorporations that included five towns before
204. See infra text accompanying notes 215-223.
205. Vote dilution refers to the merging of the minority population into a larger whole such that
minority voters can no longer elect candidates of their choice.
206. These incorporations have not received the attention they deserve, despite several valuable
historical contributions about specific cities or regions. See, e.g., SUNDIATA KEITA CHA-JUA,
AMERJCA'S FIRST BLACK TOWN: BROOKLYN, ILLINOIS, 1830-1915 (2ooo); NORMAN L.
CROCKETT, THE BLACK TOWNS (1979); KENNETH MARVIN HAMILTON, BLACK TOWNS AND
PROFIT: PROMOTION AND DEVELOPMENT IN THE TRANS-APPALACHIAN WEST, 1877-1915
(1991); HANNIBAL B. JOHNSON, ACRES OF ASPIRATION: THE ALL-BLACK TOWNS IN
OKLAHOMA (2002); ANDREW WIESE, PLACES OF THEIR OWN: AFRICAN AMERICAN
SUBURBANIZATION IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY (2004); Albert M. Camarillo, Cities of Color:
The New Racial Frontier in California's Minority-Majority Cities, 76 PAC. HIST. REV. 1 (2007);
Ankur J. Goel et al., Black Neighborhoods Becoming Black Cities: Group Empowerment, Local
Control and the Implications of Being Darker than Brown, 23 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 415
(1988); Harold Rose, The All Black Town: Suburban Prototype or Rural Slum?, in PEOPLE AND
POLITICS IN URBAN SOCIETY 397 (Harlan Hahn ed., 1972); Harold Rose, The All-Negro
Town: Its Evolution and Function, 55 GEOGRAPHICAL REV. 362 (1965).
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186o and more than fifty after the Civil War, between 1865 and 1920.207 On
both Oldahoma Territory and Indian Territory, black boosters, promoters, and
pioneers came to Oklahoma in the Land Run of 1889,20s establishing new
towns and growing older ones as both a shelter and a symbol. The towns
protected individuals from southern racism, including the late-nineteenth-
century rise in lynching and the "Mississippi Plan" laws that excluded blacks
from voting rights through poll taxes and other qualification barriers.2 ' One
historian recounted that "[iin the end, it mattered less what these African-
American seekers thought Oklahoma was, and more what they thought it was
not. . . 'racism, violence, and death."' 2 o The towns offered "a real possibility of
political participation" without racial exclusion and hierarchy, the chance for
land ownership, and the opportunity to engage in economic activity free of
racial discrimination."
At least eleven of these towns, which are listed in Appendix A, did not
survive. The historical record has focused more on the towns' founding than
their fate, leaving few particularized details of why and when each town faded
away.' What we know is that there was a major wave of dissolutions from
depopulation in the 1920s and 1930s, when the Great Depression dealt
devastating blows to the towns' agricultural economies and residents fled to
cities and to the North in search of jobs.' Isolation from markets caused by
207. JOHNSON, supra note 206, at 78-79. The most extensive historical effort to document and
catalogue these towns was the Oklahoma Historical Society's "The All-Black Towns Project"
in 1998. See Larry O'Dell, Oklahoma's All-Black Towns, OKLA. HIST. Soc'Y's ENCYCLOPEDIA
OF OKLA. HisT. & CULTURE, http://digital.library.okstate.edu/encyclopedia/entries/A/
ALoo9.html (last visited Sept. 14, 2on1). In addition to Johnson and O'Dell's valuable
sources, historians and sociologists have produced several fascinating narrative accounts of
the towns' history, motivations, and development. See, e.g., LINDA WILLIAMS REESE, WOMEN
OF OKLAHOMA, 1890-1920, at 144-84 (1997); William E. Bittle & Gilbert L. Geis, Racial Self-
Fulfillment and the Rise ofan All-Negro Community in Oklahoma, 18 PHYLON Q. 247, 257-58
(1957); Mozell C. Hill, The All-Negro Communities of Oklahoma: The Natural History of a
Social Movement, 3 J. NEGRO HIST. 254 (1946).
208. See O'Dell, supra note 207.
209. JOHNSON, supra note 206.
210. Id. at xi.
2n1. Id. at xiii; see also O'Dell, supra note 207. A 1968 news feature on Boley, one of the largest
all-black towns, recounted that for its founders, "Boley seemed anyway an earthbound
haven from white rule and white racism -one place where the Negro could 'transmit to his
children the gift of man and womanhood."' Luther P. Jackson Jr., Shaped by a Dream: A
Town Called Boley, LIFE MAG., NOV. 29, 1968, at 72.
212. In future work, I will develop the history and significance of these towns' and cityhood's
salience today as a mode of racial independence.




railroad failures in the 1930s and racial discrimination in credit lending
magnified the blow of hard economic times and the towns' tax bases declined
with town populations."' Racism added a powerful push northward.
Oklahoma established Jim Crow segregation laws immediately upon the
adoption of statehood in 1906," and blacks in the state were disenfranchised
by a "grandfather clause" in the state constitution in 1910, as well as through
gerrymandering and precinct disqualification measures during this time
period.16 Segregation was enforced through violence, including white county
law enforcement raids of all-black towns, arson of black homes, and mob
violence against residents. 17 Further racial banishment of blacks from the state
was promoted by racially restrictive covenants against black agricultural land
ownership as well as white oaths to prevent the hiring of black labor."'
Movements to escape racism through black relocation to Canada, Africa, and
Mexico took hold to further drain population from the towns."'
The loss of many of these all-black towns, along with the steep
depopulation of others, dealt a particularly stinging blow in light of the
aspirations that fueled their development. In a 1957 historical account of the
towns, the authors captured that acute loss: "[T]he degree of disillusionment
encountered by Oklahoma Negroes was perhaps as intense a Negro
disillusionment as has ever been felt in this nation, and that this disillusionment
was proportional to the degree to which the Negroes had achieved a partial
fulfillment of their wish to control their own destiny."2 o
Racial cleansing' shows up in Florida as well, including a 1923 race riot in
which a mob destroyed the all-black town of Rosewood, killed several
214. Id.
215. JOHNSON, supra note 206, at 63-65.
216. Bittle & Geis, supra note 207, at 257.
217. In an infamous incident in 1911, a woman and her thirteen-year-old son were taken from a
county jail by a white mob, which lynched the pair after reportedly raping the mother.
WILLIAMS REESE, supra note 207, at 179.
218. Id. at i8o; Bittle & Geis, supra note 207, at 257; see O'Dell, supra note 207, at 7.
219. JOHNSON, supra note 2o6, at 98-99; see O'Dell, supra note 207, at 6-7.
22o. Bittle & Geis, supra note 207, at 260.
221. This phrase comes from a valuable new historical account of racial violence and banishment
followed by land confiscation across Southern counties in the five decades following the
Civil War. See ELLIOT JASPIN, BURIED IN THE BITTER WATERS: THE HIDDEN HISTORY OF
RAcIAL CLEANSING IN AMERICA (2007).
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residents, and seized their property.m' A variant of dissolution as a means to
racial exclusion also appears in the dissolution of the City of Mobile, Alabama,
where a city's new boundaries following a dissolution in 1879 cut several
hundred black residents out of city limits. 2 3
The modern record indicates that the dissolution of majority-minority
towns raises particular concerns. The election on dissolution in Miami starkly
illustrates the power of racial independence in a public debate regarding
dissolution. When dissolution was put on the ballot in the city, the racial
consequences of dissolution were immediately at issue, including dilution of
the city's African-American and Hispanic electorates within Dade County and
the loss of an important cultural symbol, if not cultural capital, for the Cuban
community in the United States." Miami's demise felt like failure, loss.
Indeed, a newspaper poll taken before the referendum on dissolution found
that a majority of residents who agreed with all of the main arguments for
dissolution nonetheless continued to oppose dissolution itself because "the city
was a symbol of Hispanic achievement and had unique cultural and historical
significance."" And if race was part of "saving" Miami, it was also part of the
motivation to break it apart-the neighborhoods that put dissolution on the
ballot were much whiter than Miami as a whole, making dissolution the first of
two steps needed to pull away from Miami's African-American and Hispanic
majority and form majority-white city councils. Race may have factored as
strongly in the effort to dissolve Miami as in the decision to save it.
Knowing this distinct history changes the stakes when it comes to an
important current dynamic: majority-minority towns that are considering or
have considered dissolution, and those that are struggling to survive. West
Park, Florida, is an interesting case in point. It is a young city, more than 95%
black, which was shaped not by racial self-determination but by exclusion -it
was created from a pocket of unincorporated land left over after neighboring
cities, most of which were predominantly white, had cherrypicked all white
residential areas through annexation and city formation. The county sought to
withdraw from its service obligations to stranded "islands" of unincorporated
222. See CAROLYN COHENS, BLACK AMERICA SERIES: LEVY COUNTY, FLORIDA 51-52 (2005);
History's Lost Black Towns, THE ROOT (Jan. 27, 2011, 3:27 PM), http://www.theroot.com/
multimedia/lost-black-cities.
223. See MICHAEL W. FITZGERALD, URBAN EMANCIPATION: POPULAR POLITICS IN RECONSTRUCTION
MOBILE, 1860-1890, at 231-33 (2002).
224. See Steinacker, supra note 1, at 113 (describing opponents' campaign imagery depicting
Miami as "a city built by Cuban-Americans, a 'second Havana,' now lost," and advocating





land in the middle of the county, including the neighborhoods that became
West Park, and it pushed cityhood for the area quite heavily."' For West Park
to survive the current calls for its dissolution, residents must believe that
cityhood has value, and racial autonomy and independence may prove part of
that assessment.
The other dimension of white self-segregation with a potential role for
dissolution has appeared in Georgia, where the Georgia Legislative Black
Caucus has filed a lawsuit against the state seeking to dissolve five recently
incorporated, majority-white municipalities."' The plaintiffs allege that the
incorporations, which took place between 2005 and 2008, violated the Voting
Rights Act of 1965 and the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments by creating
"super-majority white" cities."" The plaintiffs will be required to prove a
discriminatory purpose in order to prevail on their constitutional claims; the
case is pending.
One final dynamic of race in dissolution shows up in Vallejo, California,
and Memphis, Tennessee -cities that starkly illustrate that vote dilution and
redistributive desegregation can come together. Vallejo, a majority Latino and
African-American city of 115,942 people, 9 recently considered dissolution in
the face of a debt and budget crisis. It opted for bankruptcy first, but
dissolution remains one of the options for cutting costs in the face of the
drastic budgetary cuts necessitated by bankruptcy. Dissolution of a city like
Vallejo is particularly significant and challenging because the unincorporated
population of Solano County (into which Vallejo would dissolve) numbers
about 19,000 and is majority white.230 A dissolution of Vallejo's scale would
require a dramatic reworking of the county budget, services, and governance,
and it could fundamentally change the county's political economy, including
racial power.
Dissolution's potential for desegregation or racial redistribution is also
vivid in a dissolution underway in Memphis, Tennessee.' At issue in
226. Wright, supra note 164; Associated Press, supra note 164.
227. Katie Leslie, Lawsuit Seeks Dissolution of Dunwoody, Sandy Springs, Johns Creek, Milton,
Chattahoochee Hills, ATLANTA J.-CONST., Mar. 28, 2011, http://www.ajc.com/news/lawsuit
-seeks-dissolution-of-888729.html.
228. Id.
229. State and County Quickfacts: Vallejo (city), Cakfornia, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, http://
quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/o6/o681666.html (last visted Nov. 29, 2011).
230. County Facts and Figures, SOLANO COUNTY, http://www.solanocounty.com/about/county
facts n figures.asp (last visited Feb. 13, 2012).
231. For more complete treatment of the Memphis school district dissolution, see Michelle Wilde
Anderson, Making a Regional District: Memphis City Schools Dissolves into Its Suburbs, 112
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Memphis is not the city but the school district.2 32 The Memphis school district
has 103,000 students, the vast majority of whom are African-American. 33
Shelby County, which includes the City of Memphis, has a separate school
district that is defined to include all children not within Memphis city and
school district boundaries-that is, 47,000 students, the majority of whom are
white. 34 In February 2011, the Memphis School Board passed a resolution
dissolving its district, a move that, under Tennessee law, would require the
county district to absorb responsibility for Memphis children.235 Opponents
have described the dissolution as "more like a takeover" than a "we're going
out of business" declaration.236 Shelby County turned immediately to the state
legislature and the courts to prevent the dissolution, but neither effort derailed
it.2
In theory, dissolution in this context could offer a mode of desegregation
accomplished without a civil rights lawsuit and without a court order - indeed,
under circumstances that have been declared beyond the remedial power of a
federal court. Yet in the context of education, where a school's catchment
area within a district can perpetuate racial segregation as much as interdistrict
demographics, there is every reason to think that the Memphis dissolution will
not affect the racial makeup of individual schools. It is likely, however, to
achieve redistributive consequences among racial groups, resulting in a net fall
in property taxes within the City of Memphis.23" A city dissolution on the scale
of Memphis city schools would have similar implications for race-it would not
change where people live (i.e., force housing integration), but it could
fundamentally alter distributive dynamics within the larger receiving entity. In
COLUM. L. REv. SIDEBAR 42 (2012), http://www.columbialawreview.org/assets/sidebar/
volume/112/47 Anderson.pdf.
232. School districts are outside the scope of this Article as a general matter, but the Memphis
case offers important lessons transferable to city dissolutions.
233. Anderson, supra note 231, at 47.
234. Campbell Robertson, Memphis To Vote on Transferring School System to County, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 28, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2oil/o1/28/us/28memphis.html?pagewanted= all.
235. MEMPHIS CITY COUNCIL, CITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION, available at http://media
.commercialappeal.com/media/static/Microsoft Word - Resolution -Surrender of MCS
Charter andPlan of Dissloution.pdf (last visited Feb. 7, 2012).
236. Campbell Robertson, Memphis To Vote on Transferring School System to County, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 27, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2ol1/o1/28/us/28memphis.html.
237. See Anderson, supra note 231, at 47-48.
238. Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 741 (1974) (striking down a district court's reorganization
of Detroit and its suburban school districts as a remedy for unconstitutional racial
segregation).




so doing, however, it would return us to the point where this Section began:
dissolution may achieve racial redistribution, but at some cost to racial
autonomy and minority political leadership.
E. Community
Most of the themes discussed in this Part turn on why dissolution drives
are launched and why some of them succeed. What are the crosswinds? The
concept of community captures a major opposing force after commencement of
a dissolution campaign. It is a notion that cityhood defines a place, forges
community bonds, and preserves local history. Captured here as well is the idea
that bonds-residents with one another, but also residents with their
government -are stronger when formed at a small scale, because participation
is better and government closer. Only a few specific examples are worth noting
from the media record, but thematically, glimmers of these ideas about
community flicker across dozens of cities.
In Williamsville and Sloan, two villages in Erie County, New York,
dissolution proposals were "crushed" at the polls with record turnout in 2010
because, in one opponent's words: "For all the problems Sloan has and for all
the problems we have [in Williamsville], with all the politicians, it wasn't
about that. It was about community."o The Deputy Mayor described Sloan as
"a community of one square mile of people knowing each other.... We know
what we have, and the people don't want it to stop.""' Some residents echoed
this idea that dissolution threatened community bonds, referring to it as an
effort by outsiders to "mess with a way of life."4'
Kevin Gaughan has tried to disentangle people's affection for their "village"
from village government, arguing that "a village is not a government," but
rather "an idea, a sense of place, a community."43 Yet opponents seem to see a
strong relationship between government and their sense of community, an
expectation that government is "more responsive" when it is small.4 An
analysis of failed dissolution votes in New York State by the Center for
Governmental Research, which has done much of the dissolution planning in
New York, included a comment that the sense of uncertainty and fear of




243. Gaughan, supra note 120.
244. Tan & Specht, supra note 24o.
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community change can outweigh claims of tax savings: "The tax savings piece
is very important, but . . . [i]f all you have is tax savings, it's still hard for
people to see why they should give up what they're used to having."" It is
something of an endowment effect, status-quo bias, or loss-aversion
argument-people value cityhood once they have it, perhaps in excess of its
actual benefits for their quality of life.
Opposition in dissolution has also turned on a dimension of history within
notions of community. The dissolution fight in Village of North Bend, Ohio,
in 2003 pitted property-tax reduction claims against "the desire to maintain our
history," which emphasized the village's eighteenth-century origins. 46In
Miami, a newspaper poll taken before the referendum on dissolution found
that large majorities of African-American and Cuban respondents to the poll
(as well as 43% of non-Cuban Hispanics and 38% percent of whites) approved
of the statement "Miami's cultural and historical importance will be lost if the
city is abolished,"" indicating a strong notion of equivalence between
cityhood on the one hand, and identity, history, and community on the other.
Dissolution can serve many purposes. Yet across this varied terrain, five
themes emerge repeatedly: economic collapse, rebellion against taxes,
corruption and mismanagement, race, and the link between legal independence
and community. Each theme constitutes a hypothesis for why dissolutions do
or do not occur, providing a foundation for scholars of law, sociology, urban
theory, and political science who turn their attention to dissolution.
Cutting through and across these themes is of course the law itself. By
prohibiting dissolution in most contexts, state dissolution laws"4 are surely
one of the primary reasons that places hang onto legal cityhood, even when the
motivations described throughout this Part invite dramatic restructuring.
Section IV.C comments on ways to loosen state constrains of this form of local
reorganization.
24S. Sandra Tan, Opposition to Change, Unknown Kills Dissolution, BUFFALO NEWS, Aug. 19, 20o,
http://www.buffalonews.com/city/articleo5153.ece.
246. Randy McNutt, North Bend's Existence in Hands of Voters, CINCINNATI ENQUIRER, Aug. 23,
2003, http://www.enquirer.com/editions/2003/08/23/locNorthBend23.html.
247. See Steinacker, supra note 1, at 114 tbl.3 .




IV. WHAT DISSOLUTION MEANS AND HOW WE MIGHT CHANGE IT
After one town's dissolution in 2008, a reporter editorialized:
How [the dissolution] is handled may answer one of the biggest
questions that rears its heads on the east side: Would the county and its
residents be better off with fewer cities and a more centralized
government? The argument against consolidation has been that the
cities wouldn't stand for it. We now know that's not necessarily correct.
In these lean times, it bears another look. 49
"Centralized government" is not a popular term these days. Yet the reporter
above captured a curious feature of dissolution: it reduces the fragmentation of
metropolitan regions into numerous municipalities, uniting more land under
the exclusive jurisdiction of county or township government. It thus creates the
potential for counties and townships to serve goals associated with regional
government, such as land-use coordination, reduced interlocal conflict, and
service consolidation. Dissolution's potential service to defragmentation and
regional governance is surprising, because proponents claim to be reducing the
scale of local government, not pursuing regionalist -let alone redistributive -
ends. Indeed, these proponents are right that dissolution means less
government, but it paradoxically also means bigger government. By cutting out
the most proximate tier of government, voters and leaders in dissolving cities
are opting to rely instead on more distant county or township governments
with accountability to larger territories. Perhaps it is for this reason that
dissolution cuts across the familiar divides in the debate over regionalism. It
can align antigovernment animus with regional government advocacy, poor
with middle class voters, and residents of cities with residents of suburbs.
Everyone might favor defragmentation, but only some would do so in the
name of empowering counties and townships.
Regionalism represents just one of dissolution's implications for local
government law, urban theory, and public policy. This Part explores those
implications. I also draw on the themes of dissolution that were developed in
Part III, five of the most significant issues at stake in dissolution. Using these
insights, this Part asks not just what dissolution has meant thus far but what it
might mean-and what it should mean-in the decades ahead. Offering
249. Mike Cazalas, Op-Ed., Cedar Grove: Thanks for the Memories, NEWS HERALD (Panama City,
Fla.), Oct. 3, 20o8, http://www.newsherald.com/articles/caz-68591-cedar-grove.html
(paragraph breaks omitted).
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theoretical context, seeds of legal reform, and a road map for future research, it
lays a path for how to nourish dissolution's potential and restrain its risks.
A. Dissolution in Local Government Law
Questions of local government institutional design and boundary change
have long been about cities, whether urban or suburban. Taking nothing away
from the significance of cities, a debate limited to them positions another key
local institution, our counties, as a mere passive backdrop against which cities
act. City-centered local government theory neglects important public law and
policy questions relating to the capacity and performance of counties and
townships as important local governments, as well as to, in human terms, life
and politics under county rule.2 so Accounting for dissolution focuses attention
on county power and institutional design, and it leads to a reconceptualization
of boundary change that focuses on shifting relationships between cities and
counties.
City formation, along with various forms of post-incorporation institutional
and legal restructuring among cities, has been treated as a one-way trajectory
of urbanization, if not progress. When we put dissolution on the map of
governance choices, an interesting change occurs: it foregrounds the shifting
relationship between cities and counties. Instead of boundary change looking
like a spectrum from rural to urban, from county to city, it looks like a loop.
The loop starts with counties, the original baseline of American local
government law.2 s' All land in the United States is located within a county,
whether or not it has a functioning government.' County boundaries are
virtually indelible-only in the rarest circumstances are new counties created,
old ones destroyed, or borders moved.' From this starting point, landowners
and communities may choose to travel an upward arc that eliminates
25o. This larger focus on county governments articulates my own multi-year research agenda,
which began with Michelle Wilde Anderson, Cities Inside Out: Race, Poverty, and Exclusion at
the Urban Fringe, 55 UCLA L. REv. 1095 (20o8) [hereinafter Anderson, Cities Inside Out];
and Michelle Wilde Anderson, Mapped Out ofLocal Democracy, 62 STAN. L. REV. 931 (2010)
[hereinafter Anderson, Mapped Out].
251. The county layer of government is known as parishes and boroughs in Louisiana and
Alaska, respectively. See 2002 CENSUS OF GOVERNMENTS, supra note 4, at v.
252. Rhode Island, Connecticut, and most of Massachusetts, for instance, are divided into
counties, though the counties have no functioning governments. Such counties serve only as
territorial descriptions for the delivery of federal grants and services. See id. at v & app. B.
253. This Article does not reach boundary changes to counties or their subdivisions, but as is the




unincorporated land by creating or expanding legal cities.2 s4 Other landowners
never leave the baseline -they express a choice for counties by failing to form
or join incorporated territory. For those who do enter incorporated territory,
they can undo that decision by turning downward to eliminate incorporated
land, returning to the county through dissolution or deannexation.ss County
to city, and perhaps back again. It is simple, but conceptualizing boundary
change in this way focuses attention on the effect of any given change on
county as well as city government, and it differentiates changes that choose
cityhood from those that choose dependence on counties or county subdivisions.
Conceiving of boundary change as a loop rather than a spectrum has
several implications. It first captures in law and legal theory what historians
have known for centuries: urbanization is not an upward ratchet. Places that
were once important can subside in significance and in scale. Populations can
rise or fall. That being the case, government should be flexible enough to make
institutional changes that reflect evolution on the ground. Yet because the
second half of the twentieth century was marked by tremendous urbanization
and fragmentation, we have built a legal system (including legislative attention,
the range and depth of state law, and policy analysis) focused primarily on the
upward arc of boundary change - incorporations, annexations, and vertical
consolidations."' This system assumes the continuation of that rise and the
continued dominance of cities in our local government legal culture. Seeing the
move to legal cityhood as something retractable contradicts our expectations of
urbanization, and thus marks a surprising, seemingly regressive, and
counterintuitive change.
Dissolution captured as the downward arc of the loop also draws attention
to the fact that people can choose county governments as their exclusive
254. This point on our loop describes all incorporated municipalities, whatever their legal status
(city, village, etc.) or degree of urbanity (our casual labels "city," "suburb," or "town").
States vary in their menu of municipalities. Incorporated places in some states (such as
California) are all legally designated as "cities," whatever their size. Other states (like New
York and North Carolina) have "cities" and "villages" distinguished by their degree of legal
autonomy, if not their size. See 2002 CENSUS OF GOVERNMENTS, supra note 4, at vi.
255. Deannexation (known in some states as "detachment" or "exclusion") describes the
reversion to unincorporated status for only part of a municipality. Though related,
dissolution and deannexation deserve separate consideration, as they are governed by
independent bodies of law, and they serve different purposes. Dissolution presents
additional complexity absent from deannexation -politicians and public employees lose
their jobs, an entity that may carry debt in its name evaporates, and a government with an
attached body of laws folds. Nonetheless, the present account's contribution to
understanding the choice to become unincorporated offers a foundation for better
understanding deannexations.
256. See supra Section I.B.
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general-purpose local governments, and they do. Counties are not merely a
default baseline, a primordial sea from which cities are born. As I have argued
elsewhere, millions of Americans live in unincorporated areas, which can be
rich, poor, urban, or rural. They can be tiny pockets or major swaths of land.
My past research on counties' responsibilities for many high poverty urban
areas and other forms of development has indicated both problems and
potential with county governance. For instance, counties have languished as a
problematic manager of high-poverty urban enclaves.' Yet counties also hold
a great deal of potential to evolve into leaders for regional coordination if they
are given tools to do so, including a role in local intergovernmental
negotiations on boundary changes like dissolution.s 8
As a final observation, the loop of city to county power, including the
option to dissolve back into unincorporated status, invites a comparison of the
way law structures counties and cities. Returning to the dissolution in Miami
(described in Section I.A) provides a useful frame for such a comparison. At
the time of the City's dissolution election in 1996 and upon reflection since,
commentators have understood the vote as a bid for regional governance-a
vote that placed Miami in a class with Jacksonville and other cities that fused or
considered fusing city and county government into a metropolitan-scale
whole." 9 Yet Miami's election was fundamentally different from the choices
made in Jacksonville, Indianapolis, and other city-county consolidations. 6 o
Lining up Miami and Jacksonville in particular to understand that difference
offers a window on what dissolution means and how it could change dominant
views of local government institutional design and boundary change.
The dissolution vote in Miami was triggered by problems-economic crisis,
corruption, and dissatisfaction with government-that had a great deal in
common with events in Jacksonville and Duval County during a period of
tumult in the early 196os: disaccreditation of all fifteen of Duval County's
257. Anderson, Cities Inside Out, supra note 250. This work considered whether county
governments are capable stewards of urban life; in other words, "whether two tiers of
general-purpose local government-a city and a county-offer urbanized areas greater
participatory voice, stronger protection from undesirable land uses, improved collective
services, and greater housing choice than county rule alone." Id. at 1095.
258. Anderson, Mapped Out, supra note 250.
259. Annette Steinacker offered a careful, valuable consideration of the Miami vote. See
Steinacker, supra note 1. However, she fell prey to the limited view described above. See id.
at 1oo ("Consolidation with the city would have ... created a very extensive regional
government, similar to that advocated in several contemporary works in urban politics.").
260. For a complete list of cities with a consolidated city-county government, see 2002 CENSUS OF
GOVERNMENTS, supra note 4, at app. B. See also infra note 265 (describing the basis for the




public high schools, an empanelled grand jury investigating corruption
allegations against numerous Jacksonville officials, rising property taxes,
hemorrhaging city population and revenue, among others."'1 Proponents of
consolidation with Duval County promised lower taxes, economic
development, and better public administration."'
Properly understood, however, the similarity between the two cities'
restructuring proposals ends there. The proposal in Miami was a breakaway
attempt to carve wealthy enclaves into separate cities; Jacksonville's solution
was a consolidation that locked more people into a larger incorporated
government. The new government approved in 1967 for Jacksonville was
created not by eliminating the City of Jacksonville, but by expanding it to
include all land within Duval County, except land already contained within
four municipalities in existence before the consolidation, and moving the
offices of Duval County into the city government. News headlines declared the
new Jacksonville to be the "Biggest City in the World!" (a true statement in
terms of land area, at least in the lower forty-eight) .,61 To this day, the
consolidated city has the powers of both a "municipality" and a "county" under
Florida law, and its charter specifically withholds the authority to form new
municipalities within the city without amendment of the city charter, which
must be approved by a majority of the citywide electors. Subsets of the
consolidated City of Jacksonville are thus unable to break away as new cities
without approval from the whole of Duval County. No new municipalities
have been created in the City of Jacksonville since consolidation.
Miami and Jacksonville represent two distinct models of governmental
consolidation. The proposal in Miami sought dissolution-a move toward
county government -because it would have created a consolidated government
261. Jacksonville's Consolidated Government, JACKSONVILLE HIST. Soc'y, http://jaxhistory.com/
journalli.html (last visited Feb. 13, 2012).
262. Id.
263. Id.
264. See CHARTER OF THE CITY OF JACKSONVILLE, FLA., art. 3, 5 3.01(a) (providing that the
consolidated government "[s]hall have and may exercise any and all powers which counties
and municipalities are or may hereafter be authorized or required to exercise under the
Constitution and the general laws of the State of Florida"); id. art. 3, § 3.ol(e)(2) (providing
that "[a] ny change in this chapter made by ordinance which affects the creation or existence
of a municipality . . . cannot become effective without approval by referendum of the
electors as provided in s. 166.031, Florida Statutes"); see also FLA. STAT. ANN. § 166.031
(West 2000) (establishing procedures for a referendum on a municipal charter
amendment).
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that "acts like a county.",265 The consolidation in Jacksonville moved the area
toward city government; that consolidation resulted in an entity that "acts like
a city." While both consolidations involved the vertical merger of one or more
city governments with their county to form a single general-purpose local
government, the critical differences between them illuminate law's distinct
treatment of cities and counties.
As illustrated by the Miami-versus-Jacksonville contrast, it matters a great
deal whether a city-county consolidation "acts like a city" or "acts like a
county." That fact determines whether residents need permission to break
away from the consolidated government to form new cities. What is behind
this difference? The answer lies in a legal asymmetry between city and county
power. Insiders to city government are the only ones with power to travel the
loop to and from cityhood. To travel the upwards arc towards city power,
landowners in nearly every state do not need permission from those they
intend to leave behind in unincorporated territory. Only a few states let
counties negotiate incorporations and annexations (but never veto or redraw
city lines against the proposed city's will); in the majority of states counties
have no power to determine the boundaries or terms of incorporations or
annexations.266 As discussed in Section I.B, counties also have little to no say in
dissolutions. Whether a boundary change removes territory from the general-
purpose responsibility of the county (the upward arc towards cityhood), or
265. These terms, city-county consolidations that "act like a city" and those that "act like a
county," come from U.S. Census classifications, which usefully distinguish the two forms.
Consolidations that "act like a city" make up the much larger group of cities, which includes
the following general types of consolidations: the City-County of San Francisco and the
City-County of Honolulu (governments legally designated as city-counties and operating
primarily as cities); the Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County (an
area designated as a metropolitan government and operating primarily as a city); and the
City of Jacksonville (which subsumed the government of Duval County and thus has certain
types of county offices within the city government). The same is true for municipalities that
perform county functions but lack any formal "county" government (like Baltimore City or
thirty-nine cities in Virginia). At least a dozen other cities belong on this list as well. See
2002 CENSUS OF GOVERNMENTS, supra note 4, at app. B.
266. The primary determinant of incorporation is simply whether the residents of the territory
proposed for citybood approve the change. See Richard Briffault, Our Localism: Part I The
Structure of Local Government Law, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 74 (1990). It is not that states do
not give power to any local agencies to block or modify a proposed city formation; indeed,
in states with extraterritorial jurisdiction laws, creation of a new city may require approval
by adjacent city governments. See generally STEVENSON, supra note 27, § 1.o57] (describing
rules requiring consent by existing municipalities). For a detailed exploration of disparities





adds territory to that responsibility (the downward arc of dissolution),
counties are positioned as silent and passive.
This treatment positions counties as a default in local government. Yet
counties are fundamentally changed as land moves along the loop of city
power, and we have a great deal of work to do to understand what land and
power is left to them as land cycles toward and away from cityhood.
Differences between cities' and counties' power to influence the movement of
land to and from cityhood renders the territory of counties' unincorporated
land an involuntary terrain mapped by the choices of others. Counties are
involuntary at their origin in that their first borders are created by decisions at
the state level, rather than by local constituencies making democratic decisions.
They remain involuntary over time, in that county governments (and county
subdivisions in a minority of states) serve as the residual tier of general-
purpose local government for any land that has not incorporated or been
annexed-whether that land is urban, rural, poor, rich, compact, or
splintered.117 In most states, counties have weak or no control over the
transformation of unincorporated land and people into cityhood.
While a state-by-state comparative analysis of incorporation and
dissolution procedures is beyond the scope of this Article, as a general matter,
it is noticeable that the law also substantively favors the upwards arc, i.e., makes
it easier to incorporate than to dissolve. The substantive restrictions on what
types of cities are eligible for dissolution are quite severe, for instance, when it
comes to population and city size (as discussed in Section I.B). By contrast, few
states set a population threshold or a minimum city size for incorporation
purposes.6 5 I will say more about my own view of those differences in Section
IV.C, but for now, suffice it to observe that if boundary change is a loop, there
are ways that law privileges cityhood by making it difficult for territory to exit
that status.
In short, land and its occupants can leave an unincorporated jurisdiction
with greater ease than they can return to it, and counties enjoy little influence
over either change. By contrast, cities draw the boundaries of their territory by
267. Elsewhere, I have argued that counties' position as residual governments, as well as their
formally equal accountability to incorporated and unincorporated area voters, has had
adverse impacts on unincorporated high poverty neighborhoods and county governments
themselves. See Anderson, Cities Inside Out, supra note 25o; Anderson, Mapped Out, supra
note 250.
268. At least eighteen states do not require a minimum population to qualify for incorporation as
a municipality, or the population threshold they set is 300 or less. See I U.S. CENSUS
BUREAU, supra note 30. The only states with a minimum population above this number are
Arizona, Florida, Illinois, Massachusetts, Ohio, Pennsylvania, and Tennessee. Id. at 12, 54,
77, 138, 223, 240, 263.
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choice. Once a city has formed, state laws generally lock its residents together,
holding them mutually accountable within a democracy governed by
participatory rights over boundary changes. Landowners and neighborhoods
cannot leave without citywide approval, whether through secession or
deannexation. That is why secession efforts in Staten Island, New York, and
San Fernando Valley, Los Angeles, failed, and why the wealthy neighborhoods
in Miami thought they could not prevail at breaking away from Miami in a
single step.269 The unified interests of the whole are thus favored over the
personal interests of some to pursue self-determination and self-interest.
Leaders of the breakaway attempt in Miami thus tried to annul the entire
democratic unit of the City of Miami, returning land to the starting point -the
involuntary default of county governance where residents are no longer tied to
one another through equal voting rights on boundary changes.
Law thus treats municipalities as voluntary democracies with rights to
include and exclude territory, and counties as a primordial state with weak or
absent rights to shape their unincorporated territory. This positions counties as
lying closer to state governments, with relatively immovable borders and a role
more akin to an "arm[] of the state[]" than a locally "representative bod[y]."27 o
Yet such a view is in tension with the position held by the U.S. Supreme Court
since 1968 that counties, like cities, are subject to the Fourteenth Amendment's
constitutional guarantee of one person, one vote, a position that depended on a
view of counties as democratic, general-purpose governments and
deemphasized counties' specialized responsibilities for rural areas."'
Situating dissolution within the larger context of local governance requires
one final note. Dissolution belongs within a larger public-policy conversation
about consolidation of smaller units of local government into larger ones -a
conversation that, as mentioned, has revived in recent years. 7 ' However, that
conversation should maintain an awareness of two different forms of change
and consolidation within it. One form is those boundary changes that alter the
269. See supra note 24.
270. Richard Briffault, Who Rules at Home?: One Person/One Vote and Local Governments, 60 U.
CHI. L. REV. 339, 339, 346-48 (1993).
271. Avery v. Midland County, 390 U.S. 474, 481 (1968) ("In a word, institutions of local
government have always been a major aspect of our system, and their responsible and
responsive operation is today of increasing importance to the quality of life of more and
more of our citizens. We therefore see little difference, in terms of the application of the
Equal Protection Clause ... between the exercise of state power through legislatures and its
exercise by elected officials in the cities, towns, and counties."). I took up these challenges in
earlier work, and will return to them down the road. See Anderson, Cities Inside Out, supra
note 250, at 1140-45.




city-county relationship (I will call them vertical boundary changes). The other
is those that do not, i.e., those that shift power among municipal governments
(horizontal boundary changes). Horizontal changes reorganize municipal
territory to change the governments that serve that territory, but do not change
the amount of land served by a municipal government. They may rename,
reform, and remap incorporated entities; they may even eliminate a
municipality, though only on the path to creating or expanding one. For
instance, mergers, secessions, and reclassifications terminate a municipal
corporation, but do so as a legal step towards horizontal reconfiguration of
municipal territory. 7 ' Horizontal power shifts are interesting and important,
whether they reflect a city's health and expansion, or weakness and loss of
identity. Yet they do not require either vertical integration or disentanglement
of city and county governments nor change the unincorporated/incorporated
status of land. As I have argued elsewhere, it is inappropriate to blur the
distinctions between counties and incorporated municipalities;74 rather, much
work is needed to understand their differences and the relations between them.
For that reason, mergers and dissolutions are meaningfully distinct, even
though both of them offer a version of consolidation.
Dissolution thus changes the landscape of institutional design and
boundary change in several ways. It differentiates vertical from horizontal
boundary changes - those that do and those that do not change the city-county
relationship. Within vertical boundary changes, it illuminates how the shifting
relations among cities and counties amount to a loop of jurisdictional choices -
county to city, city to county. The way that law structures the rules for moving
along this loop fundamentally affects the nature of county and city
government, indicating a legal preference for cityhood. Law makes it relatively
difficult for residents to go from incorporated to unincorporated status,
something that, on the one hand, impairs the fragmentation of that territory
into new, smaller cities, but, on the other hand, also protects existing levels of
municipal fragmentation by constraining municipalities whose residents wish
to rejoin larger county territories. Herein lies an important reminder of a point
made in this Article's Introduction: dissolution, like other boundary changes,
273. For instance, the merger of two cities requires dissolution of one or both cities, but it
ultimately only consolidates rather than removes the municipal layer of government.
Merger's mirror image, secession, breaks one larger municipality into two smaller ones.
Local government reclassification (for instance, changing the legal status of a city from a
third-class to first-class city) may also require termination and reformation of the municipal
corporation, but it does not change land's inclusion within a municipal corporation.
274. Anderson, Cities Inside Out, supra note 250; Anderson, Mapped Out, supra note 250.
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can be used to pursue varied values. Liberating its positive potential and
constraining its downsides requires a carefully developed body of nuanced law.
B. Dissolution in Urban Theory
If dissolution presents important implications for local government law, so
too does it bring a new and necessary conversation to urban theory: shrinking
local governance to adapt to urban and regional decline. When that shrinkage
manifests as dissolution, it presents a paradox and perhaps an opportunity:
dissolution offers an unusual and noncoercive mode of regionalism,
particularly in suburban and rural areas, that might reduce local fragmentation
without coercing municipal residents. To understand these observations and
their significance, including the break they mark from prior academic theory,
this Section begins with a quick tour through the intellectual history of post-
World War II American urban and local government theory and the changes it
responded to on the ground.
Local government law as an academic field grew up amidst the postwar
suburban boom and the toll it took on older core cities. The widespread
incorporation of new municipalities and the resulting landscape of legally
fragmented metropolises generated a spirited debate about the causes, costs,
and benefits of small municipalities and metropolitan fragmentation."' For
some commentators, incorporations of small cities in certain contexts had the
potential to cultivate political participation, racial empowerment, and
community building.17 Others, particularly economic theorists, viewed local
fragmentation as an innovation that cut local government costs, encouraged
local differentiation and specialization, and maximized residential choice. 77
Alongside this admiration came widespread criticism. Suburban incorporations
were condemned as mechanisms of privatism, wealth accumulation, and
275. One of the most significant milestones in understanding the incorporation boom was an
empirical analysis of the purposes of city formation. See NANCY BURNS, THE FORMATION OF
AMERICAN LOcAL GOVERNMENTS: PRIVATE VALUES IN PUBLIC INSTITUTIONS (1994). Burns's
work offered a role model for aspects of research in the present Article, and I hope that it
will inspire future empirical work on dissolutions.
276. See, e.g., GERALD E. FRUG, CITY MAKING: BUILDING COMMUNITIES WITHOUT BUILDING
WALLS (1999); Sheryll D. Cashin, Middle-Class Black Suburbs and the State of Integration: A
Post-Integrationist Vision for Metropolitan America, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 729, 762-76 (2001);
Goel et al., supra note 206.
277. See, e.g., WILLIAM A. FISCHEL, THE HOMEVOTER HYPOTHESIS: How HOME VALUES
INFLUENCE LOCAL GOVERNMENT TAXATION, SCHOOL FINANCE, AND LAND-USE POLICIES
(2001); THE TIEBOUT MODEL AT FIFTY: ESSAYS IN PUBLIC ECONOMICS IN HONOR OF WALLACE




exploitation by higher-income areas, as well as means for white households to
exclude minorities without using de jure segregation tools.7 5 Commentators
also observed interlocal competition and race-to-the-bottom dynamics
generated by fragmentation within single metropolitan areas.17
For those who objected to the racial segregation and spatial economic
polarization that came with fragmentation, regional governments enjoyed early
favor as a redistributive solution.2 So too did involuntary annexation rules, a
way to permit cities to capture growth in their suburbs without permission
from suburban residents."' Some scholars sharing concern for the racial and
socioeconomic consequences of fragmentation, however, came to advocate
forms of regional cooperation and responsibility that derived not from
centralization by regional governments but from city empowerment to combat
interlocal problems. 52 Still others have continued to advocate for regional
governance under the banner of reforms promoting "regional equity," an
umbrella policy principle encompassing distributive issues in employment,
education, transit, and housing across metropolitan areas.283
278. For key works of legal scholarship considering the distributive and racial impacts of
metropolitan fragmentation, see, for example, FRUG, supra note 276; JONATHAN LEVINE,
ZONED OUT: REGULATION, MARKETS, AND CHOICES IN TRANSPORTATION AND
METROPOLITAN LAND-USE 67-85 (20o6); Richard Briffault, The Local Government Boundary
Problem in Metropolitan Areas, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1115 (1996); Sheryll D. Cashin, Localism,
Self-Interest, and the Tyranny of the Favored Quarter: Addressing the Barriers to New
Regionalism, 88 GEO. L.J. 1985 (2000); Richard Thompson Ford, The Boundaries of Race:
Political Geography in Legal Analysis, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1841 (1994); Laurie Reynolds,
Intergovernmental Cooperation, Metropolitan Equity, and the New Regionalism, 78 WASH. L.
REV. 93 (2003); Richard C. Schragger, The Limits ofLocalism, loo MICH. L. REV. 371, 405-15
(2001); and David Dante Troutt, Ghettos Made Easy: The Metamarket/Antimarket Dichotomy
and the Legal Challenges of Inner-City Economic Development, 35 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 427
(2000).
279. See, e.g., DAVID RUSK, CITIES WITHOUT SUBURBS (1993).
28o. See Briffault, supra note 278; Cashin, supra note 278; Reynolds, supra note 278.
281. See Laurie Reynolds, Rethinking Municipal Annexation Powers, 24 URB. LAw. 247 (1992).
282. Gerald Frug and David Barron are leading voices for this view. See, e.g., GERALD E. FRUG &
DAVID J. BARRON, CITY BOUND: How STATES STIFLE URBAN INNOVATION (2008) (arguing
that state law often prohibits cities from addressing problems, especially regional ones, like
housing and crime); David J. Barron, The Promise of Cooley's City: Traces of Local
Constitutionalism, 147 U.PA. L. REV. 487 (1999) (exploring local governments' ability to give
life to constitutional principles); Gerald E. Frug, The City as a Legal Concept, 93 HARV. L.
REV. 1057, 1083-90 (1980) (arguing that our conception of cities as subdivisions of state
power has constrained their ability to address current problems).
283. See, e.g., BREAKTHROUGH COMMUNITIES: SUSTAINABILITY AND JUSTICE IN THE NEXT
AMERICAN METROPOLIS (Paloma M. Pavel ed., 2009); GROWING SMARTER: ACHIEVING
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The latest chapter in the evolving conversation about America's cities has
turned back to urban policy within inner cities hopelessly divided from their
suburbs. It confronts the accumulated consequences of several decades of
decline in cities hit hardest by white flight, population loss, and economic
abandonment-Detroit, Buffalo, and other Rust Belt cities in particular. These
cities are the focus of the shrinking cities movement in scholarship and policy,
which has developed a range of urban-planning techniques to reconcentrate
and reorganize remaining populations into a reduced number of
neighborhoods served by the city government. 5 4 These techniques include
both familiar and novel elements: zoning strategies, land banking, block- and
even neighborhood-scale demolition, withdrawal of services, and the like.
Goals include reducing the territory covered by city government services,
greening the city with new parks and urban agriculture, and reducing the social
isolation and public safety risks caused by blighted urban land within occupied,
high-poverty neighborhoods. From the point of view of environmental
amenities, it is a green-space centralization program reminiscent of the
egalitarian ideals embodied in Frederick Law Olmstead's landscape
architecture.28
By structuring the machinery of decline, such techniques signify a
surprising but pragmatic pessimism that assumes these cities' sliding
populations will not rebuild any time soon. The shrinking cities movement
thus rejects an important assumption that animated the debate over
metropolitan fragmentation: that urban areas were growing, traveling an
upward arc towards increasing local government complexity, if not progress.
This assumption posited that even though core cities were struggling, their
regions continued to grow-more incorporated cities, more special districts,
more development and growth across the metropolitan territory. Scholars and
policymakers largely focused on trying to seduce that growth back to the
LIVABLE COMMUNITIES, ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE, AND REGIONAL EQUITY (Robert D. Bullard
ed., 2007).
284. See Catherine J. LaCroix, Urban Agriculture and Other Green Uses: Remaking the Shrinking
City, 42 URB. LAw. 225 (2010); Witold Rybczynski & Peter D. Linneman, How To Save Our
Shrinking Cities, PUB. INT., Mar. 22, 1999, at 30; Joseph Schilling & Jonathan Logan,
Greening the Rust Belt: A Green Infrastructure Model for Right Sizing America's Shrinking Cities,
74 J. AM. PLAN. Ass'N 451 (2008).
285. The "greening" ideals of shrinking cities' land-use planning are equally fascinating in that
they are beginning to move open space away from the "greenbelt" concept embodied by
cities like Portland and towards the "green heart" concept in the Netherlands, where the
nation's four major cities surround a large nature preserve. The center of Detroit will never
hollow out to become a rural area, of course, but one can imagine significant blocks of the





central city. Shrinking cities reform ideas, by contrast, focus on inner cities and
inner cities alone, giving up hope that population and economic activity lost to
the suburbs will return to the city without a fundamental reorganization of the
city's housing, transportation, and parks. In short, they give up on regionalism
and growth, at least in the near term.
Dissolution opens a new chapter in understanding shrinking cities, a
chapter we can think of as shrinking governance. Like the land-use strategies of
the shrinking cities movement, dissolution recognizes that cities may not grow
and grow. In some places, what goes up will come down. Dissolution shifts
focus from a land-use context (how do we adapt our use of urban space to
reflect reduced population and economic hardship?) to a governance context
(how do we change our institutions of local government to reflect these
conditions?). Shrinking cities prompt a range of governance questions: Should
these governments shrink their territory through deannexation? Should they
reduce the size of their governing bodies or reorganize and contract their
bureaucracies? Should they outsource more services to counties or special
districts? At the most dramatic end lies dissolution: Should shrinking cities
dissolve their governments altogether?
Whether in reference to land-use planning or governance, the word
"shrinking" is important for its reference to ongoing decline rather than
complete abandonment. Just as the "shrinking cities" concept does not refer to
true ghost towns, but rather to places that we would call "depopulated" only
relative to their former size, so too is modern dissolution a response to
increments of economic decline and/or population loss that are proportionally
substantial but not complete. Like shrinking-cities ideas, dissolution offers a
mode of coping with these increments long before the ghosts take over.
Dissolution moves us beyond shrinking cities as well. First, it offers a
backdoor way of achieving regionalism and defragmentation in suburban and
rural areas."' In counties where the dissolution of one or more cities will unite
large amounts of suburban and rural land under county/township governance,
dissolution can offer suburban and rural regionalism. This form of regionalism
differs significantly from the aspirations that came before, as it recognizes
unification of territory outside the urban core as a form of consolidation, even
if it leaves the inner-city borders intact. Such an approach fails to address the
problems of a big inner city directly, though it might improve things that are
important to the metropolitan area as a whole, like service coordination and
cost control.
286. Consideration of dissolution in large, central cities like Vallejo, Oaldand, and Miami
suggests that it may become a coping tool for larger cities as well.
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Instead of creating new regional governments-federations of
municipalities and the like- dissolution offers the hope that removal of some
suburban and rural local governments can strengthen counties as rational,
responsive governments capable of strategic land-use control across larger
areas of suburban and rural land. Yet even imagining that dissolution might
consolidate more authority under a bigger tier of local government, dissolution
may nonetheless be about smaller, weaker local government insofar as counties
are understaffed and unregulated in comparison to cities. When moving on a
vertical axis between city and county government, bigger need not mean
stronger. Counties vary dramatically in their capacity to provide urban services,
engage in serious land-use planning, and foster civic engagement.
Even where dissolution fails to unify a "region" in any complete sense, it
can nevertheless be said to achieve progressive modernization of local
government law by reducing local fragmentation, and, in particular, by
eliminating separate governments for areas that are too small to sustain them
efficiently. Many states have seen vociferous calls to reduce the number of local
governments. Illustratively, New York's government reform website (discussed
in depth in Part II) features a graphic of a house being crushed by falling bricks
standing for thousands of local governments.117 A reform report in
Pennsylvania quoted a local news article lamenting: "The complicated web of
little governments snares tax dollars like a spider traps insects. Residents must
demand an end to the steady feeding .... The legislative findings behind
formation of a statewide commission to reduce the number of local
governments in New Jersey carried a similar message-many local
governments means higher taxes, and both sets of numbers are just too
high."' Beyond tax control, there is surely a coordination argument to be made
as well -a proliferation of local governments means there are just too many
politicians around to get much done across a metropolitan area. Gaughan, the
crusader for dissolution in Western New York, suggested this argument when
he bemoaned: "With 439 elected officials throughout Erie County-each with
individual purposes, powers, and views - accountable leadership, or just plain
287. 10,521 Governments, OFFICE ATT'Y GEN., http://www.reformnygov.com/govs.html (last
visited Nov. 29, 2011).
288. FRANK J. LUccHINO, RECLAIMING HOPE: VOLUNTARY DISINCORPORATION IN ALLEGHENY
COUNTY 3 (1994), available at http://www.briem.com/files/LucchinoDisincorporatel.pdf
(quoting the May 9, 1993 edition of the North Hill News Record).
289. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 5 2:2 7 D-501(a)-(b), (e) (West 2010). With mention of Pennsylvania and
New Jersey, however, it bears noting that dissolution is not currently an option under those
states' laws, because both lack land in unincorporated status. As discussed in Section IV.C,
reform of the law of dissolution in those states would thus require unlocking dissolution as




leadership, has eluded us."2"o Seen simply as a means to reduce the number of
governments, whatever its other effects, dissolution thus has the potential to
correct a problematic feature of incorporation laws: they fail to set population
minimums and thus have long enabled creation of legal cities for tiny
populations."
To move beyond mere talk of regionalism or government reduction-to
move from words to institutional change -requires either coercion by the state
or consent by affected areas. Herein we find two other important
characteristics of dissolution as a means to the ends of regionalism or
consolidation. Unlike many of the regionalist proposals to have come before,
most dissolutions are wholly voluntary, although the population whose
preferences are accounted for in the decision is relatively narrow. While the
state sets the terms of dissolution, making it easier, harder or impossible to
dissolve, states very rarely force a city to dissolve. Several states have
established commissions to recommend consolidation and streamlining in
government, but none have given those commissions the power to coerce or
mandate restructuring."' From the vantage point of municipal residents, the
power to dissolve (or not) lies in municipal residents' hands. In that way, it
does not intrude on city empowerment and autonomy-the most consistent
basis for criticism of coerced or state-led regionalist solutions.'9 Yet in every
state except Michigan, the right to consent to a dissolution is limited only to
the city's population. This sets a much lower bar for approval of dissolution
than that generally set for mergers and other consolidations, where bilateral
consent is nearly always required. Dissolution may thus be both more palatable
and more likely than other means of consolidation, making it an attractive site
of reforms to enable consolidation, if, as developed in the next Section,
counties are given the tools to receive dissolving cities and govern them
effectively.
Dissolution is thus interesting and important for its contrast with the
twentieth-century valence in local government law and theory, focused on the
easy widespread formation of new municipalities and the resulting landscape
of legally fragmented metropolises. It may represent an important innovation
to cope with economic and urban decline at the level of the individual
municipality and wider region.
2go. Gaughan, supra note 123.
291. See, e.g., Briffault, supra note 266, at 73-75.
292. See supra notes 287-289 and accompanying text.
293. See, e.g., Gerald E. Frug, Beyond Regional Government, 115 HARv. L. REV. 1763 (2002); Jerry
Frug, The Geography of Community, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1047 (1996).
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C. Dissolution as Public Policy and Seeds ofLegal Reform
Hundreds of America's municipalities -whether urban, suburban, or
rural -are in extreme fiscal distress. These are our cities facing population loss,
commercial or industrial retraction and restructuring, rising taxes, and strained
services. Some are rusting capitals like Buffalo or Detroit, others are sunbaked
centers of the housing market collapse, like Vallejo and Stockton in California.
Some are tiny and some are sizable. Some are dutiful, like towns seeking
merger, consolidation, or shared services but unable to secure willing partners.
Some are choked by corrupt or incompetent management. All raise questions
about reform and restructuring. Is there a breaking point in population
diminution, economic contraction, or mismanagement when city elimination
might help? Especially in an era when state aid is thinning and bailouts are
increasingly infeasible, might dissolution belong on our list of coping strategies
for fiscal distress?
The void in research on dissolution makes these normative questions
difficult to answer. Shaping a modern law of local government that provides
tools for these places tomorrow requires an understanding of dissolution's
place today and yesterday, and this Article takes a first, foundational step at
that understanding. Based on that research, I offer here some normative
thoughts to guide a long-term discussion of dissolution as a matter of public
policy, to lay some parameters for state-level legal reform, and to inform local
voters and leaders about worthy considerations when contemplating a
dissolution.
To answer whether dissolution should be available as a mode of
restructuring starts with this question: What is the state's vision of the nature
of its cities and counties? Some states are committed to a vision of cities as the
governing body for all urbanized (and suburbanized) land, with unincorporated
area status reserved for agriculture and industry. Such a vision assigns housing
and housing-related services to cities. Florida has made recent efforts in pursuit
of this conception in some counties (notably Broward County), as have states
with involuntary annexation laws."' Elsewhere, counties have grown into
major urban-service providers for unincorporated territories - something that
makes counties and cities alternative forms of governance for residential and
other land uses. In the first version of the city/county division of labor,
dissolution of populated territory should be constrained, because it would
work against the state's long-term vision of governance. In the second version,
dissolution rules should be much looser, allowing landowners to consider the




pros and cons of city and county government and creating the potential for
counties to govern larger areas of unbroken unincorporated territory. Under
such circumstances, dissolution permits residents to say that they no longer
want, need, or are willing to pay for that level of proximity to their local
government.
Where it makes sense as a matter of state policy, I strongly support legal
changes to permit experimentation and flexibility with dissolution. Section
II.C's discussion of New York's legal reforms explains one state's trajectory to
clear the underbrush of those municipal governments deemed unnecessary,
expensive, and dysfunctionally competitive, and I find New York's laws to be a
model in most respects. Calls for a reduction in the administrative costs of local
government have been particularly acute in postindustrial regions with
declining populations, as in New York. Shrinking cities theory has not yet
taken on the shrinking region, yet many shrinking cities, indeed much of the
Rust Belt, are located within entire metropolitan regions - core cities,
incorporated suburbs, outer villages-that have lost economic activity and
population. In outer areas, decommissioning land from developed use may not
yet be necessary; however, pressure is mounting to address sliding economic
fortunes and the reduced ability of citizens to sustain costly services and
governance models. Dissolution, with its potential to help trim away
government in suburban and rural cities at least, should be considered a viable
option for reform in these regions.
Changes to support experimentation and flexibility with dissolution should
take two forms: (i) adding dissolution codes in those states that lack them, and
(2) raising and reforming population maximums where they exist. On the first,
reform to enable dissolution as a mode of government consolidation and cost-
cutting may be appropriate in states where dissolution is not currently possible
at all, for instance because of a structural characteristic like the lack of
unincorporated land. Pennsylvania has seen two recent efforts to establish
dissolution laws, and thus, unincorporated territory. In response to
depopulation and economic decline in many of the state's towns, from the rural
to the postindustrial, Frank Lucchino, the Controller for Allegheny County,
Pennsylvania, authored draft legislation and a lengthy policy evaluation
championing dissolution in 1994.'9 Pennsylvania does not have
unincorporated land; every inch of the state is included in a municipal
corporation, including cities, towns, and boroughs."' This gives the state more
295. See LUCCHINO, supra note 288.
296. Id. at 1; see LoCAL GOv'T COMM., GEN. ASSEMBLY OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF PA.,
PENNSYLVANIA LEGISLATOR'S MUNIcIPAL DESKBOOK 11 (3d ed. 2006), available at
http://www.lgc.state.pa.us/deskbook.shtml.
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than iooo municipalities, which ranks it third in the nation for the number of
municipalities.9 Yet that legal structure has necessitated municipal
governments for areas with tiny populations,29' extremely low tax revenue, and
plummeting real estate values. "
Lucchino's efforts resulted in Pennsylvania House Bill 1321, which
proposed the creation of unincorporated areas and a mechanism for
dissolution.3oo The preamble of the bill expressed the need for dissolution and
its promise for positive change. The bill described how some municipalities
"have significantly diminished populations and have become sufficiently
economically distressed that their viability as independent municipalities is
doubtful, but such municipalities are not attractive candidates at this time for
merger or consolidation."3o' Dissolution, it claimed, would "substantially"
reduce "[t]he administrative duties and costs of such municipalities," and their
management by county government would "stabilize them, facilitate their
economic revitalization and make them more attractive candidates for merger
with other municipalities.'"30 2 The bill was ultimately unsuccessful, but the
effort revived in 2010 with a more radical legislative proposal: to pass a
constitutional amendment to eliminate nearly 2500 local governments - all but
sixty-four of the state's municipalities and towns- and make counties the basic
level of government in Pennsylvania.30 3 In addition, the Governor's Office has
promoted a bill to create a commission that would recommend local
consolidations across the state. Meanwhile, extreme stresses on municipal
297. 2002 CENSUS OF GOVERNMENTS, supra note 4, at 3 tbl.3.
298. Municipalities in the state have populations as low as three to a few hundred people. A total
of 409 municipal corporations in the state have populations under iooo. This places
Pennsylvania ninth in the nation for the highest number of municipalities with populations
below iooo. See 2002 CENSUS OF GOVERNMENTS, supra note 4, at 9 tbl. 7 .
299. LUCCHINO, supra note 288, at 1-3 (describing population losses as high as seventy-eight
percent in municipalities hit by mine closures and other changes); id. at 5-6 (describing
tenfold differences in tax yield between the most and least economically distressed
municipalities in Allegheny County).
300. H.B. 1321, 20ol Leg., Reg. Sess. art. XXXI-D, 5 3102-D (Pa. 2001), available at
http://www.legis.state.pa.us/CFDOCS/Legis/PN/Public/btCheck.cfm?txtType=PDF&sessY
r= 2001&sessInd=o&billBody=H&billTyp= B&billNbr= 1321&pn= 1550.
301. Id. 5 3102-D(2).
302. Id. 5 3102-D(3)-()-.
303. Jan Murphy, Bill Calls for Eliminating Pennsylvania's Municipal Governments, Switching to
County-Based System To Save Taxpayers Money, PENNLIVE.COM (Apr. 28, 2010, 12:oo AM),
http://www.pennlive.com/midstate/index.ssf/2oo/o4/bill-calls for eliminating-pen.html.
For the total number of subcounty general-purpose local governments in Pennsylvania, see




governments, including major service cuts and plummeting revenues have
meant, in the words of Pittsburgh-based regional economist Christopher
Briem, "[t]he de facto disincorporation of our region's municipalities has
already begun."3 o' Even if cityhood still exists legally, it is little more than a
geographic label if the government has no money or power.
The second realm of legal change to enable dissolution's defragmentation
potential involves lifting population ceilings - i.e., dissolution eligibility rules
that require the nearly complete depopulation of a municipality.3 o' Research for
this Article indicated that populated municipalities do dissolve in the majority
of states that have dissolution codes but no population limits for them,
indicating demand for dissolution among populated places in states that permit
it. City deaths in those states indicate that a falling population symptomatic of
local economic depression is a common trigger even in the absence of rules
requiring it; however, such population drops may bring a city down to a
population much higher than the ghost town numbers of 5o to ioo people
that are set as maximums for dissolving cities in many states. A truly
depopulated ghost town is only one manifestation of outmigration,
deurbanization, and loss of community, whether rural or urban. Indeed, it may
well be that the relatively low number of twentieth-century dissolutions
(compared with city formations) is due in part to law's role in stifling
dissolution as an answer to depopulation and distress.
The population figures in these codes are thus excessively low in a modern
era. As states consider appropriate numbers, the most useful metric may not be
absolute population figures at all, but rather proportionality of the dissolving
city's population to the county's unincorporated territory. For instance, a
hypothetical city of 120,000 that dissolves into Los Angeles County's
population of more than one million unincorporated residents would be
different from Vallejo's similar population dissolving into Solano County's
unincorporated population of just 19,ooo. Proportionality measures offer a
ready alternative. In the context of a school district dissolution law, for
instance, the State of Tennessee recently passed a law establishing special
approval procedures in cases where the dissolving district's population would
more than double the size of a county district.3os
One final big picture reform is warranted. Incorporation law and
dissolution law should be planned and developed as an integrated body of law.
304. Christopher Brien, Forum: Why Regionalism Is So Hard, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, July 9,
2006, http://www.post-gazette.comf/pg/o6190/704221-1o9.stm.
305. See supra Section I.B.
306. S.B. 25, 107th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Tenn. 2011).
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With boundary change conceived of as a loop, as described in Section IV.A, we
notice that incorporation law matters not only as an area is urbanizing and
forming a new legal city in response to that growth, but also after a period of
cityhood and dissolution. Where incorporation is easy, it favors use of
dissolution to further later breakaways by prosperous neighborhoods -the
Miami example. This city formation, in turn, can undermine redistribution and
polarize regional wealth. Asymmetries between incorporation and dissolution
law may be appropriate in some cases (e.g., one can easily imagine that New
York would not wish to permit new villages to form as easily as they can
dissolve, when the state hopes to phase out that governmental form), but they
should not be the result of careless assumptions about dissolution only
mattering for ghost towns.
Innumerable specific issues lie beneath these meta-questions of "whether
dissolution" and the overall structure of dissolution law. These issues are
usefully divided according to constituencies affected by dissolution law,
including: the governments and residents of counties and their subdivisions,
the residents of dissolving cities, and the state. Below, I present a few thoughts
about structuring dissolution law according to each group's needs and
interests.
Arguably the most important constituents of dissolution law are counties
and their subdivisions - their governments, their residents, and (as a distinct
subset of those residents) unincorporated residents. Any state legislator should
care about counties for counties' own sake, i.e., because they govern existing
unincorporated populations, and they may carry a great deal of regional
administrative responsibility, including provision of metropolitan services. But
counties or their subdivisions also must be a central concern to a dissolving
city's residents, who will come to depend on them following a successful
dissolution.
Do dissolutions and the law of dissolution make counties stronger or
weaker? On the one hand, current law makes counties quite powerless over
dissolutions -the rules governing dissolution instantiate a view of cities as
voluntary associations (mini-democracies in which the power to create or
destroy the city lies with their populations alone), in contrast to counties and
townships, which passively gain and lose population from their tax base and
their police powers.3o In terms of their territory at least, counties are
awkwardly powerless. They must manage their budgets independent of the
state, just like any local government, and yet they do not enjoy the territorial
self-determination that is a hallmark of local autonomy and fiscal planning.




Yet county powerlessness need not be the whole picture when it comes to
dissolution. Unlike the loss of unincorporated population through
incorporation or annexation, dissolution could give counties more power in the
long run -more territory to govern, tax, serve, and plan for, along with more
geographic and regional cohesion in unincorporated county territory. Because
most approved dissolutions have occurred in smaller cities, they offer the
potential for the rural and suburban regionalism discussed in Section IV.B:
the unification under county government of any territory that is not within the
core of the metropolitan area. Reducing local agency fragmentation is
extremely important for land-use planning in such areas, because interlocal
competition for development at the urban edge is a major contributor to
sprawl.os Dissolution has significant advantages as a means towards
regionalism, because it is achieved through defragmentation. It removes a local
government rather than creating a new regional entity, something for which
there is little appetite. To boot, it is locally grown: county empowerment
through dissolution does not require coercion by higher levels of government.
This version of county empowerment, however, will not apply in all
counties. It depends on the amount, character, and spatial arrangement of
unincorporated land already under county authority. For instance, as
mentioned earlier in this Section, some highly urbanized counties are trying to
get out of the business of governing unincorporated areas and move towards
specialization as a second-tier metropolitan government and state
administrative unit. In such cases, acquiring a patch or two of territory would
be unwanted and inefficient. Dissolution of a suburb bordered by large areas of
unincorporated land, on the other hand, may help counties to harmonize land-
use planning at the urban fringe, assuming (and this is a key criterion to note)
that counties in that state have the power and resources to engage in
meaningful land-use planning.3 '09 For this reason, states with urbanized
counties should look to Florida's example of a substantive dissolution factor
regarding the postdissolution composition of unincorporated territory.3"o
As a general matter, taking counties' interests seriously, which I consider a
normative commitment, could take two forms: (1) give counties the power to
block dissolutions (as is currently the case only in Michigan), or (2) let counties
shape substantive terms of a dissolution through pre-dissolution negotiations,
308. See Michelle Wilde Anderson, Sprawl's Shepherd: The Rural County, 99 CALIF. L. REv.
(forthcoming 2012) (on file with author).
309. Id. (manuscript at ii) (discussing differences among counties in the legal authority and
administrative capacity to engage in land-use planning and control).
310. See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
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or at least construct the law to account for their interests through factors
considered by boundary agencies or reviewing courts (as in Florida and
California). From the state and public-interest point of view, the first track is
unwise. While counties should be integrally involved and considered in
enacting and planning a dissolution, a regime that would instead make
counties capable of vetoing proposed dissolutions would mean that the most
marginal municipalities are given the least room for institutional restructuring.
Indeed, my aspiration for some counties to mature into regional governments
requires that, with the support of their states, counties rise to the occasion of
enabling regional defragmentation.
Thus I strongly favor the second course, which allows lawmakers to tailor
criteria to reflect the specific circumstances of their state and the public values
that should be protected in any boundary change. The interests of dissolving
city residents under county government require that among these substantive
criteria should be a concern for postdissolution services, as appears in
California's dissolution law."' Services are critical from residents' point of
view, but also for reasons of public safety and the environment. What cities
and counties will find upon consideration of such criteria will vary, but in
many contexts, special districts and county providers of urban services offer a
way to liberate cities to dissolve without losing services.
A decision not to grant counties the power to consent to dissolution is only
desirable if counties are given what they need to succeed in the governance of
unincorporated areas and if counties embrace their role as regional entities in a
vertical hierarchy with municipalities. Specific dissolutions and dissolution law
in general give counties the opportunity to discuss and consider their needs
and potential at a regional scale -particularly the opportunity for coordinated
land-use planning to reduce sprawl. To nurture counties' fiscal health and
good government, their consent and power in city incorporation proceedings is
independently and symmetrically as significant as their power over dissolution.
Losses or gains in taxable land and service territory both matter. If dissolution
laws that give counties no power to consent and affect the terms of the
dissolution illustrate a form of county powerlessness that may hurt counties
facing dissolutions of troubled cities, so too does it hurt counties when their
richest property tax base can escape into incorporated status and leave the
county with leftover pockets of rural and suburban poverty.
Separate and apart from their shared interests with counties, dissolving-
city residents have an additional interest: in states that will enable dissolution,
what do voters need to know to make informed decisions about it? State law




must facilitate decisionmaking with better information and study of
dissolution by requiring a certain amount of pre-election voter education and
interjurisdictional planning over the terms of a dissolution. Pre-election
planning is key, as illustrated by the spate of failed dissolution drives in New
York, where anxiety about uncertainty is widely seen to have squashed
dissolutions that may have been in the state's broader interests."' Such
planning and study should account for the ability of new or expanded special
districts, or the extension of county service networks, to serve residents' needs.
As a mode of boundary change, dissolution cannot be classified merely as
uniformly good or bad; in varied circumstances, it serves varied values. This
will always be the case. But we can and should learn much more about
dissolution's ability to alleviate fiscal crisis, achieve lasting local
defragmentation, and pursue other public-policy objectives. The next Section
charts a path to answer those questions.
D. Directions for Future Research
In the dissolution debates taking place in cities across the country,
assumptions fly. Proponents claim tax reductions and service improvements
and opponents decry the dilution of democratic influence and the loss of
community. Grandiose promises oppose grave warnings; details are loose and
tempers run hot on all sides. Such claims are no surprise given how little we
know about dissolution. This Article builds a foundation of information; this
Section suggests some structure for future research.
The first dimension of necessary research is further empirical analysis of
the determinants of dissolution activity -a more detailed look at the "where,
when, why, and why not" of dissolution. Which cities are candidates for
dissolution? How do population size, the age of the municipality (i.e., years
since incorporation), public debt, foreclosure rates, the taxes levied in the city,
and the taxes levied by other units of government relate to the potential for
dissolution? From these inquiries we can learn answers to the following
questions: Is dissolution a phenomenon limited to small cities or old cities,
debtor cities or high-tax cities? In addition, how do political preferences (as
measured by the party affiliations of city elected officials and national election
preferences) relate to the risk of dissolution? Researchers should investigate
alignment (or lack thereof) between dissolutions and ideological or political
312. See supra Section II.C.
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commitments. Political scientists have conducted analogous research on
incorporations and the dissolutions of special districts.
Empirical analysis is also needed to investigate the consequences of
dissolution-what ends does it serve, under what conditions? Paired with the
values of good governance more broadly, the issues identified in Part III
indicate that dissolution's impacts should be measured against the following
sets of values: (1) local democracy, including local autonomy, electoral
accountability and participation, and public transparency; (2) the preservation
and pursuit of local health, safety, and welfare through local law and services;
(3) racial equity and fairness in the distribution of political power, economic
opportunity, and prosperity; and (4) efficiency, including the cost-effective
management of public services, the reduction of externalities and "races to the
bottom" among local governments units, and front-end incentives for
competent, responsible management of public funds.
Dissolution also has impacts on other local governments, and state-specific
research is needed to assess the capacities of governments that would receive a
dissolving city's territory (whether a town (as in New York), a county (as in
Florida), or a township (as in Wisconsin)). Do these receiving units have
experience and staffing to provide city services, such as urban law enforcement,
water and wastewater utilities, and sophisticated land-use planning? Although
such research would be hampered by our currently poor understanding of
county and township governments (a problem that my research seeks to
address over the longer term), it is critical that we not assume that all receiving
entities are alike in their capacity or institutional design.
Future research must also consider who is affected by dissolutions, and the
resulting implications for economic and social inequality. Demographic and
socioeconomic data (including poverty rates, race and age demographics,
housing tenure) about the individuals who reside in cities with dissolution
activity would help identify who is experimenting with - or pushed to - this
form of boundary change. To assess the potential effects in terms of
stratification, comparative analysis would be useful. Data about dissolving
cities and their residents should be compared to data from similar cities that do
not consider dissolution, which would help tease the effects of dissolution as
opposed to the larger socioeconomic forces at work. Comparative studies may
also explore why some cities undergo dissolution while other, similar cities do
not.
Finally, empirical analysis is needed about the effects of the legal
environment - that is, particular dissolution law regimes - on whether or not




cities dissolve. Such research would have two independent facets. The first is
quantitative analysis of specific features of dissolution law, e.g., identifying
which states provide notice to a county government, and which states require a
plan for municipal services. Research on annexation law provides models for
this work.314 The second facet needed is longitudinal analysis of dissolving
cities: comparing taxation rates and service fees, the range of services provided,
the local election participation rates, the number of special districts serving the
city's territory, and other factors before and after dissolution. Longitudinal
analysis, which will build our understanding of the impact of dissolutions, will
be critical for comprehensive normative evaluation and policy recommendations.
Moving beyond empirical work, my own legal theory work will continue to
build our understanding of the nascent ideas offered in this Article, including
the concepts of shrinking governance and de facto dissolution;"s the value of
cityhood or census-designated place status for a community; the significance of
dissolution for the vertical relationships among states, counties, and cities; and
the potential for counties to serve as regional governments.
As research moves forward, I hope that dissolution will teach us not only
why and how cities decline, but also why they do not. Historian Emily Mackil
captured this imperative: "Analysis of [urban abandonment] is . . . as
important for our understanding of the polis as analysis of its origins, for
failure can effectively highlight the conditions, practices, and procedures that
were essential to its viability and flourishing."316 Why cities decline may hold
important lessons for why they thrive.
V. DEAD CITIES, RECONSIDERED
This Article has used the language of city "death." Yet dead in law may be
living within. Inside a city falling in population or losing economic ground,
one still sees people and life and urbanity. From the outside, such a city may
appear to be only its absences, a relation to its larger, grander past. One is a
modern, lived experience; the other is an act of memory concerned only with
what is lost.
314. See, e.g., PAULA E. STEINBAUER, AN ASSESSMENT OF MUNICIPAL ANNEXATION IN GEORGIA AND
THE UNITED STATES: A SEARCH FOR POLICY GUIDANCE 68-69 (2002), available at
http://www.cviog.uga.edu/free-downloads/53.pdf (providing a detailed, four-state
comparative study of the features of annexation law and recommendations for reform in
Georgia).
31S. See Anderson, supra note 155.
316. Mackil, supra note 9, at 493 (referring to the abandonment of Greek city-states).
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Artists and photographers working on our sliding, shrinking postindustrial
cities provide a valuable reminder of these contrasting perceptions.
Photographers from the strong cities of New York City, Paris, and elsewhere
have descended on Detroit, creating a small cottage industry of coffee table
books memorializing the city's "ruins."3' These pictures document buildings
once full now empty, floors littered with debris, nature in the process of
reclaiming land, deteriorating symbols of the city's greatness. The artists
capture beauty, sorrow, change, and history. Their photos are acts of reverence
for silent places where the only life is moss overtaking a floor, seeming to
capture a void where posturban might become pre-urban again, and
posthuman might return to prehuman wilds.
Photographers living in Detroit reject this eulogy for their city. In a project
called "Can't Forget About the Motor City," photographers Romain Blanquart
and Brian Widdis resist pronouncements of death and memory. Their images
depict movement (fresh car tracks, people dancing, a child on a bike, parades)
and ongoing vitality (pregnancies, musicians, beekeepers, meditating monks,
young romance, plants in nurseries).' 8 They do not pretend that their city is
prosperous, but they focus on the people instead of the empty spaces.
Blanquart and Widdis write: "The global media and many visiting
photographers see Detroit as an abandoned and dead city. Picture after picture
of our modern ruins, buildings that were once the pride of our city. What is
constantly absent from this soulless pictures are the people. 85o,ooo residents
still call it home . . . ."11 These words remind us of the difference between
decline and death; 850,000320 is less than half of Detroit's population at its
height-a stunning fall that requires dramatic public-policy interventions to
manage the physical abandonment caused by such depopulation. Yet Detroit is
still big -bigger in fact, than many of our obviously living cities, like San
317. See, e.g., DAN AUSTIN & SEAN DOERR, LOST DETROIT: STORIES BEHIND THE MOTOR CITY'S
MAJESTIC RUINS (2010); DETROIT DISASSEMBLED: PHOTOGRAPHS BY ANDREW MOORE
(Barbara Tannenbaum ed., 2010); YVES MARCHAND & ROMAIN MEFFRE, THE RUINS OF
DETROIT (2010).
318. See Jennifer Guerra, Ruin Porn, STUDIO 360 (Jan. 7, 2011), http://www.studio36o.org/
20 11/jan/07/-ruin-porn.
319. Romain Blanquart & Brian Widdis, Statement, CAN'T FORGET THE MOTOR CITY,
http://ww.vw.cantforgetthemotorcity.com/index.php?/about (last visited Feb. 6, 2012).
320. Unfortunately, their statement is no longer numerically accurate, though its sentiment
holds. The 2oo Census records greater decline in Detroit's population-now down to
713,777. Press Release, U.S. Census Bureau, U.S. Census Bureau Delivers Michigan's 2010
Census Population Totals, Including First Look at Race and Hispanic Origin Data for





Francisco, Boston, and Washington, D.C. For the people who live there,
Detroit is alive. Reconfigured, perhaps even disfigured, but alive.
Blanquart and Widdis remind me that a catalogue of so-called dead cities
includes places that are alive but changed. Like abandoned buildings, the
dissolution of a city marks urban change - it describes something that has
come before and no longer remains-but dissolution does not stop history or
end a community. A local government is dead, but all is not ruins and
tumbleweeds. Life carries on, with memories mixing into the landscape of a
living present. So too does civic engagement -to pull down a city government
takes meetings, op-eds, petitions, and voters. A local government may not be
required to mark a community or establish placehood.
CONCLUSION: CITIES OF YESTERDAY
Years ago, in a cornerstone analysis of local government law, Richard
Briffault observed that courts treat incorporation as a "healthy development"
signifying the growth and democratic maturity of an area's citizens."' What
then is signified by dissolution? Failure, migration, modernization,
macroeconomic decline, political housecleaning, a win for the people against
government, a win for larger government against the people? This Article has
laid a foundation for thinking about how we might reshape the law of
dissolution to reflect the roles it has played in the past: as the machinery of
government disassembly for a locality that has withered away, as a coping
mechanism for acute economic crisis, as punishment for corruption and
mismanagement, as a means to reduce government costs or improve
redistribution, as a way to reshape local racial power. Dissolution emerges as a
way to improve, exclude, cope, and reform.
Dissolving Cities paves the way for the modernization of dissolution law,
bringing it out of the era of early twentieth-century ghost towns and into the
territory of twenty-first-century fiscal distress and shrinking governance. Since
the year 1995, at least 373 cities have dissolved-more than the number we
know to have dissolved in the hundred years before that. Postindustrial cities
that have lost huge portions of their revenue and population have begun to
give up the aspiration of a full recovery to a vibrant past. Now needing to move
beyond land-use planning for the shrinking city, such places are confronting
local governance itself. From the histories and analysis herein, we see that for
cities that struggle, dissolution may be part of the life cycle of urbanization and
the management of decline. It belongs in the toolbox of local government
321. Briffault, supra note 266, at 77.
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reform. To put it there in more states for more cities, and to do so with the
interests of counties and residents in view, will require policy change and
experimentation. The latter, at least, is well underway.
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